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THE CHALLENGE

What is being abolished is 41 autonomous man — the
inner man. . . His abolition
I has long been overdue. Au
tonomous man is a device • used to explain what we
cannot explain in any other way. He has been constructed from
our ignorance, (p. 191)
A scientific view of man offers exciting possibilities. We
have not yet seen what man can make of man. (p. 206)

The above words were penned by the distinguished psychol
ogist B. F. Skinner (1971), who is considered by many to be the most
important psychologist of this century. He is today's leading
spokesman for behaviorism and the champion behind psycho
logical engineering. His operant conditioning theory has produced
noticeable changes in American education, counseling, and busi
ness management. Time magazine (Sept. 20, 1971) called Skinner,
"the most influential of living American psychologists, and the most
controversial contemporary figure in the science of human be
havior, adored as a messiah and abhorred as a menace' (p. 47).
Skinner is a continual focus of debate because he is firmly
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committed to the propositions that human nature can be completely
understood through the methods of natural science; that human
behavior is determined by the environment; and that the psycho
logical control of human behavior is the only hope for the immense
problems facing mankind in the twentieth century. These ideas,
however, cut against the grain of much of the philosophical and
theological thought of the last twenty-five hundred years and have
caused many to raise cries of alarm or serious philosophical ques
tions about their adequacy. Francis Schaeffer (1972), for example,
writes:
We are on the verge of the largest revolution the world has ever
seen—the control and shaping of men through genetic en
gineering and chemical and psychological conditioning. Will
people accept it? Idon't think they would accept it if (1) they had
not already been taught to accept the presuppositions that lead to
it and (2) they were not in such despair. But many have accepted
the presuppositions and they are in despair, (pp. 35, 44)
M.my others have apprehensively seen in Skinner's work the pro
phetic shades of 1984, Brave New World, or A Clockwork Orange,
with their images of dictatorial controllers with advanced academic
degrees in behavioristic psychology (obviously).
Skinner, on the other hand, sees his ideas as the solid product
of years of careful scientific research. He feels that his research and
writings on behaviorism have sufficiently countered the inept
theologies and literatures of freedom and dignity. In his opinion
behaviorism ts the only area of psychology worth studying today. As
he stated in an interview with Psychology Today (Hall, 1967):
I think we have put our finger on something of extraordinary
mportance here—and when we get the truth out, everything will
fu'es which we have seen and are still
'
A ,
'n8t. " ,^?rn one cannot make a very serious mistake.
futUre °f Psychol°8V lies- ** well
worth the telling

L J

ifw.
£* M ,r°m correct when he assesses the importance of
dS pffX^uce^- While he may be extreme in his view
that
that behaviorism contains most of the truth worth telling in
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psychology, Skinner has had such a great impact on our society that
no educated person should be ignorant of his theories.
Skinner began his research in the 1930's studying the condi
tioning of rats and other animals in highly controlled experimental
chambers. Since that time his basic research methods and ideas
have been used to speed up animal learning, improve patient be
havior in psychiatric wards, cure problems like bed wetting and
stuttering, eliminate disruptive or delinquent behaviors, improve
human learning ability and speed, develop self-control of unwanted
habits, and more. Skinner's inventive flair captured popular atten
tion when he unveiled such behavioristic offerings as teaching
machines, pigeons that played ping pong, and scientifically de
signed baby cribs. His work has also spawned a host of successful
graduate students and spurred the proliferation of new journals de
voted to behavioristic topics.'
It has not been only on the lofty scientific level that Skinner's
influence has been felt, but on the popular level as well. Who of us
has not heard parents state in Skinner's own language that they
hesitated to rush to their crying baby's crib lest they "reinforce" its
crying behavior? Everyone who takes an introductory psychology
class comes away thinking a little more like a behaviorist. It has
become increasingly obvious that Skinner's behaviorism is an im
portant part of the fabric of our thinking and our daily lives. Because
of this great influence and the fact that Skinner's behavior control
applications are being proposed for the large-scale management of
society, it is of utmost importance for us to critically examine and
count the cost of the behaviorism we are being sold.
FIVE CHALLENGES

There are five aspects of Skinner's be
haviorism that challenge traditional ways of
looking at life. These areas challenge assumptions of the academic

'The following list of journals and their founding dates chronicles the growth of
behavioristic research as Skinner's theories became increasingly more accepted by
the scientific community, loumal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior (1958);
Behavior Research and Therapy (1962); The loumal of Applied Behavior Analysis
(1968), Behavior Therapy (1970); Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry
(1970); loumal of Behavior Technology (1971).
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community and society at large and therefore demand our careful
examination. This book will attempt to bring these challenges into
focus.
The Challenge To Human Dignity
The data and theories of Skinner have been used to challenge
the traditional view that human nature is something intangible and
free. While Skinner is a descendant of a long line of academic
scientists who have challenged such lofty views of man, and while
he made his views quite clear in earlier writings, it was not until his
Beyond Freedom and Dignity filled the book racks in 1971 that his
mechanistic views on human nature became widely known and
debated. Skinner was of the opinion that, for too long the truth
about the control of human nature by environment had been hidden
in technical jargon and the data graphs of behavioristic journals.
Therefore, in 1971, the challenge was delivered to the public.
The Challenge To Human Freedom
Skinner's challenge to the traditional concept of human free
dom and responsibility deserves careful examination and critique
for two reasons. First, since scientists believe less and less in the
freedom and dignity of man, their applications and technologies
could begin to treat man with less humaneness and dignity. Histori
cally, when a segment of the population has been considered to be
less than human technically (e.g., the mentally disturbed, the
human fetus, a minority group), that segment has been treated with
less humaneness practically.
Second, as the prevailing lofty view of human nature and free
dom declines, even if that view is correct, individuals in society can
begin to lose the awareness of their own freedom and the confi
dence in their own ability to resist environmental influences. The
concept of self-fulfilling prophecy predicts that if science leads us to
believe that everything we do is caused by our genes and our envi
ronments, we will begin to lose the ability to direct our own futures.
Our society would become more passive, and educators, therapists,
and jurists would be less and less inclined to view individuals as
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responsible—even for criminal behaviors. Even if Skinner's theories
on determinism are not true, human nature is still in danger of
becoming a piece of the environment by default. This is part of what
C. S. Lewis (1947) meant when he wrote:
It is in Man's power to treat himself as a mere 'natural objecf and
his own judgements of value as raw material for scientific mani
pulation to alter at will. The objection to his doing so does not lie
in the fact that his point of view (like one's first day in a dissecting
room) is painful and shocking till we grow used to it. The pain and
shock are at most a warning and a symptom. The real objection is
that if man chooses to treat himself as raw material, raw material
he will be; not raw material to be manipulated, as he fondly
imagined by himself, but by mere appetite, that is mere Nature, in
the person of his dehumanized Conditioners, (p. 84)

The Challenge To Value

Skinner's behaviorism and its accompanying technology also
raise a major challenge in the area of values. There is no doubt that
the science of behaviorism has been sufficiently developed to permit
its use in individual settings and for small-scale social control. Even
this limited usage raises serious questions ofvalues and ethics and the
possibility of wide-spread social control raises questions that can
challenge the very foundations of the ethical values of our society.
Skinner suggests a general value structure that can guide be
havioral technology and ultimately address questions like, What is
the optimum in human personality and behavior that these
technologies are attempting to produce? What restrictions guide the
use of punishment? and Is the group to be valued over the indi
vidual? How are we to respond to his proposed directions and does
his naturalistic philosophy provide an adequate basis for answering
the tough ethical questions science and technology are raising? This
challenge is also posed by the other natural and social sciences and
it is a crucial one.
The Challenge To Philosophy

A fourth challenge set forth by Skinner is a philosophical one.
Skinner claims that when anyone criticizes his views, the argument
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is not with him, but with well-demonstrated, scientific facts. By
suggesting that his critics, with all of their high-sounding philo
sophical criticism, have failed to understand the science behind his
psychological theory, Skinner essentially attempts to wipe out all
competing philosophical views. Considering the credibility our
culture has given to science, this challenge has been effective for
Skinner in some quarters.
To face this challenge Skinner's critics point out that a particu
lar scientific enterprise is only as sound as its philosophical as
sumptions. They suggest that Skinner is not speaking as much from
laboratory data about human nature and human freedom as he is
from prior assumptions regarding materialism, empiricism, deter
minism, and the nature of acceptable data in psychology. Skinner's
science needs to be examined in the light of these assumptions to
see what in his theory is a product of his science and what is a
product of his assumptions.
The Challenge To Human Problems
A final challenge posed by Skinner is his willingness to apply
his scientific theory to even very difficult human problems. One
cannot listen to or read Skinner without sensing his concern for
human beings and the future of the human race. Since he believes
the problems of war, pullution, crime, and emotional illness can be
solved by his technology, he is challenging all alternative views for
social change. Included in this challenge is a questioning of the
entire Judeo-Christian view of human nature and the potential for
the Gospel of Jesus Christ to change human nature and to heal
personal and social problems. In many ways the Christian scientist
should be challenged by Skinner's last words in Beyond Freedom
and Dignity. "A scientific view of man offers exciting possibilities.
We have not yet seen what man can make of man" (p. 206).
SKINNER'S
"ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY"

Si nee, for Skinner's behaviorism, the environment is seen
as the controller of a person's
behavior, it seems appropriate to consider Skinner's environmental
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FIGURE 1

'B. F. Skinner" photo courtesy of B. F. Skinner
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history with an eye to its "influences" on Skinner. Skinner is one of
the more interesting psychologists of our time. It took an unusual
individual to sculpt from dull learning theories such things as pi
geons that fly missiles and a well-written novel about a behaviorally
engineered community. He is also a man who saw fit to live within
at least some of his own ideas. His younger daughter spent most of
the first thirty months of her life in an air crib, a large box with
climate control. He even charts his own productive hours in his
office in the same way that he charts the behaviors of his animals!
Skinner was raised in rather ordinary family, academic, and
religious surroundings. His Bible training, which he describes as
"liberal," did not foster in him a belief in the supernatural. In fact,
early in his teens he announced to one of his teachers that he no
longer believed in God; he has not regained that belief. How much
his atheism affected his later beliefs on reality, man, and ethics is
difficult to determine, but that assumption must be recognized as an
environmental factor.
Skinner graduated from college with a major in English and
what might be called a minor in fun-loving pranks. His literary
abilities had been appraised when he was still a senior in college by
Robert Frost, who wrote him encouraging comments. After gradua
tion Skinner went to Greenwich Village and spent six months as a
writer. He felt he was a failure at writing, because he had nothing to
say, and he began to wonder if the literary method was as effective
as science in changing things.
Skinner s interest in psychology was strengthened by his read
ing of Pavlov's Conditioned Reflexes (1927), Bertrand Russell's
losophy (1925), which devoted a lot of time to John Watson's
e aviorism (1924—25) and Watson's book. After this time period
Skinner enrolled in Harvard for graduate study in psychology.
ter graduate work under Edwin Boring and postdoctoral re
search at Harvard, Skinner went to the University of Minnesota.
JT ,6 taught for the first time, lecturing to large introductory
wnnlrl

(19581

i°f^

s^ectlons'

Since he was teaching from material that
^'s ^'rst book, The Behavior of Organisms
e wonders whether his students were aware that they
ec°me
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were hearing a legend-to-be speaking on ideas that were soon to
dominate the entire field of psychology. It was also at this time that
he began work on Verbal Behavior (1957) that was to take over
twenty years to complete.
During World War II Skinner undertook two of his more fa
mous projects. He began "Project Pigeon" when he worked with
the office of Scientific Research and Development. He taught pi
geons to operate the guidance system of the Pelican missile. Al
though they performed excellently, his Kamikaze pigeons saw no
active combat. Near the end of the war Skinner and his wife had
another child, Deborah. In order to make these infant years easier
on parents and child, he mechanized child care with his air crib. It
was basically a large glass box with temperature control and sliding
glass doors. He later wrote an article on this for the Ladies Home
Journal.
During seven weeks of the summer of 1945 Skinner wrote
Walden Two (1948), his Utopian novel about a behaviorally con
trolled community. At the time he seriously considered beginning
such a community (Skinner, 1967).
At one time I seriously considered an actual experiment. I could
be one of the most dramatic adventurers in the twentiety century.
It needs a younger man, however, and I am unwilling to give up
the opportunity to do other things which in the long run may well
advance the principles of Walden Two more rapidly, (p. 404)

In the fall of 1945 Skinner became the department chairman at
Indiana University. In addition to administration he ran some
experiments on pigeons and helped to found the Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior and Division 25 of the American
Psychological Association. Finally, in 1948 Skinner joined the De
partment of Psychology at Harvard where he conducted research
and taught courses in human behavior. In the 1950's when his
daughters were in school he took an interest in the educational
process and this led to his development of the teaching machine. By
1958 Skinner's work had been so well received that he was honored
with the American Psychological Association's Distinguished Sci
entific Contribution Award.
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FIGURE 2
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he slidthat

his seventies, Skinner continues to write ar
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Verbal Beha '' 'h

and r^soH r
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he is
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Behaviorism is a formulation which makes possible an effective
experimental approach to human behavior. It is a working
hypothesis about the nature of a subject matter. It may be
clarified, but it does not need to be argued. I have no doubt of the
eventual triumph of the position—not that it will eventually be
proved right, but that it would provide the most direct route to a
successful science of man. (pp. 409-10)

THE PLAN OF THIS BOOK

This analysis of Skinner's behav
iorism will begin with a look at the

philosophical and scientific foundations on which the theory is
built. Chapter 2 examines the philosophical assumptions from
which Skinner operates as a scientist and includes a look at Skin
ner's view of the person, development, and psychopathology.
Chapter 3 reviews the specifics of Skinner's operant conditioning
theory.
Chapters 4-7 contain a critique of Skinner's behaviorism;
chapter 4 examines problems with the scientific basis for Skinner's
behaviorism by asking the question, Does the laboratory data sup
port the radical behaviorism of B. F. Skinner? Chapter 5 looks at
Skinner's explanation for human mental states to see if it is satisfac
tory in the face of rationalistic data. Chapter 6 examines the prob
lems with Skinner's view of complete determinism. And Chapter 7
discusses the difficulty Skinner's behaviorism has with deriving
value and giving direction to the proposed behavioral technology.
Many times in class, when I have been critiquing another sci
entist's position on an issue, my students have asked, What would
so and so say to that objection, if he were here? It seems to me that it
would be fair to give Skinner a chance to respond to his critics;
Chapter 8, therefore, examines some of the more common objec
tions to Skinner's behaviorism by providing answers from Skinner s
own writings. Chapter 9 concludes with a look at the relationship of
Christian beliefs to Skinner's behaviorism.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATION

No science is conducted in a
totally objective and unbiased
fashion. Scientific data collection and theory generation
are profoundly affected by the •• assumptions the scientist
brings into the laboratory. In fact, even the scientist's choice of a
laboratory is based on these prior assumptions! These assumptions
are part of a scientist's paradigm, or world view. Since the appear
ance of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(1962), scientists have been keenly aware of the effect of their
philosophical assumptions on their scientific activities. In an earlier
work (Cosgrove, 1979) I attempted to show that the theories of
human nature and human problems in psychology are as much a
product of the psychological world view under which a psychol
ogist operates as is the research done in the laboratory. Assumptions
about the nature of reality, the nature of man, and the nature of
knowledge impact our views of the nature of the problems facing
humanity.
The manner in which prior assumptions affect scientific activ
ities can be divided into three categories. First, one's assumptions
21
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affect the subject matter one chooses to study. A psychologist who
believes that man is only material will have a greater interest in
studying human brains than haunted houses. A psychologist who
believes in organic evolution should have a greater interest in com
parative psychology than one who does not. Second, a scientist's
assumptions affect what methods are chosen for use in the labora
tory, and these methods directly affect what is discovered. For
example, a psychologist who does not believe that human mental
phenomena are of any consequence is more comfortable observing
only the behavior of subjects. This results, however, in limiting our
knowledge of humans to behaviors instead of (or in addition to)
thoughts and feelings. Third, prior assumptions can affect one's
interpretation of the data collected in the laboratory. A scientist who
believes in an orderly cause-effect universe is more likely to inter
pret an ESP mind-reading experiment as subliminal perception than
as extrasensory perception. Because of beliefs about reality, the
scientist is predisposed to look for natural, regular causes that ac
count for the observations.
SKINNER S
ACADEMIC ROOTS

in analyzing Skinner's theoretical perspectives it is important to begin with his general
assumptions as a scientist and a psychologist
since these assumptions play a great role in his brand of be
haviorism. It has been said that osvrhnlnav hac a ch^rt
h,,t a

Empiricism and Associationism

latprl p^terms emP'nc'sm and associationism are integrally re•
piricism refers to the sensorv "writine" nn thp hlank clatP
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or stimulus inputs are associated with each other. The basic princi
ple of association is contiguity—two experiences occurring closely
together in time are likely to be associated. Stimuli may also be
associated with behavioral or biological responses, and these
stimulus-response (S-R) relationships become the basis for learning
and personality.
FIGURE 3

Empiricism

The "mind" is composed of
S-R (stimulus-response)
associations. Ideas are
merely raw copies of sense
data.

Rationalism

The mind interacts with and
reflects on sense data. The
question is not whether sen
sory experience modifies
ideas but to what extent it
modifies them.

A comparison of empirical and rationalistic models of knowledge and
the person.
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If empiricism means that all knowledge comes from the senses,
then how do I know that this object in my hand is a pen? What is
needed is a kind of mental glue to hold together all the stimulus
sensations capable of being experienced from this object. Associationism is the glue. Stimuli and responses that occur closely together
in time often enough become associated, such that one stimulus
alone can cause the memory of the rest. Thus, to an empiricist, the
operations of the mind, or the nature of the person, are understood
by studying S-R relationships. It was with this emphasis that experi
mental psychology began and while Skinner does not consider him
self an S-R psychologist, his empiricism lends itself to theories of
learning quite similar to S-R psychology.
Pavlov and Watson

Association as a psychological principle was built into the re
search of both Ivan Pavlov and John B. Watson. Association ism also
affected the more contemporary figures D. O. Hebb, whose cell
assembly theory was an associationistic metaphor, and B. F. Skin
ner, whose operant conditioning theory emphasizes the association
between behavior and reinforcing stimuli. Pavlov, the Nobel
Prize-winning Russian physiologist, considered that the basis of
associations is structural, and that repeated experiences somehow
alter the structural features of activated neural elements. With his
now famous classical conditioning experiments, Pavlov tried to
show that not only were inborn reflexes a part of the behavior of
organisms, but learned reflexes (associations) were also. These
earned reflexes were formed when neutral stimuli were associated
with natural stimulus-response reflexes. The neutral stimuli soon
were able to elicit the reflexive responses. As a materialist and a
mechanist, Pavlov was asking the question, Is it not possible that all
e avior an even mind" itself are just the combination of
p ysio ogica re exes? According to Pavlov, his experiments with
dogs and salivation and the letters cs, ucs, CR, and UCR must have just
now re exive y entered your awareness as I discussed his work.
3 S0^ wais su ficientlY influenced by Pavlov's work to use the
lone re ex as a basic building block for the theoretical con-
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struction of behavior. As the father of American psychology, Wat
son virtually guaranteed that psychology would take an empirical,
associational direction. According to Watson, the only subject
matter for psychology was behavior, since behavior could be ob
served. Watson cast aside terms like will, mind, awareness, desire,
and idea; they were of no interest to psychology, since they could
not be studied scientifically. Since Watson's behavioristic alterna
tive is closely related to his empirical, associationistic foundations,
we often use the term behaviorist for any psychologist who takes an
empirical, mechanistic view of human nature. Actually, most psy
chologists consider themselves behaviorists in that they recognize
the scientific advantages of using behavior as data; not all are radi
cal behaviorists, however, since they believe in the mind, not sim
ply as a complex stimulus-response structure, but as an innate prop
erty of a person. Thus Watson and Skinner are best considered to be
"radical behaviorists." This term will be elaborated later.
Skinner's Inheritance
Although Skinner follows in the general direction of Pavlov and
Watson, he does not accept classical conditioning as a paradigm of
association learning. He accepts instead operant conditioning. This
means that while he accepts the empirical, associationistic model of
learning, he rejects the reflex learning of Pavlov, where responses
are elicited by stimuli, in favor of instrumental learning, where the
organism emits a response apparently at "will." Skinner's psychol
ogy, therefore, has less mechanical flavor to it than Watson's, even
though he sees the organism as nonetheless determined.
Skinner also differs from the simple S-R psychology of Watson.
He has incorporated E. L. Thorndike's law of effect into his theory.
Thorndike felt that for most behavior there was no triggering
stimulus that automatically produced behavior, but that behavior
was influenced primarily by the expected consequences of that
behavior. In other words, acts that have favorable consequences
will recur. Skinner has added reinforcement as the critical stimulus
element in any potential S-R relationships. Since it is reinforcement
that follows behavior that becomes effective in causing that be-
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havior to recur, Skinner's S-R theory might be written S1-R-S2 where
S2 is the stimulus reinforcement.
Since Watson wanted to reduce man to his physiological con
structs and classical conditioning, reflex learning theory gave the
impression that he denied the importance of the mind and viewed
men as machines. This is not so with Skinner. He is content to
reduce man to molar behavior (bar pressing, running, etc.) and
admits to the operation of a mind, but insists that such a mind is
formed by the same S-R-S associations that structure behavior.
Therefore, Skinner's "person" turns out to be a machine that does
not appear mechanized.
What Skinner does accept from his academic ancestors is as
important as what he rejects. He accepts the empirical, associationistic model of man, with reinforcement as the essential stimulus
ingredient in learning. With Watson, he denies the existence of the
free, independent mind or soul, and accepts a description of be
havior as the complete description of a person. Therefore, B. F.
Skinner is very much a part of the S-R, behavioristic tradition in the
United States, and is, in fact, its leading spokesman.
SKINNER'S

We are now prepared to examine more

MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS

closely the assumptions that have shaped
the nature of Skinner's theories and

ideas. These assumptions involve three areas: reality, the human
person, and the path to knowledge.
Naturalism and Materialism in Reality

While psychologists do not usually find it important to discuss
their assumptions about the ultimate nature of reality, it is not hard
to discern Skinner's beliefs. He participates in the western world's
secu ar, scientific mentality. His current writings indicate an
aca emic impatience toward religious beliefs; in earlier writings
, "7 'nd'cated that he was an a^eist (1967). All of this suggests
3
6 u° i.S !° ^ natura''stic, materialistic picture of reality. This
means t at e elieves that the universe is composed of only matter
energy, rea ity does not include God, demons, souls, or other
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nonmaterial elements. This universe, according to naturalists, is a
closed system in which every effect must have a material cause.
The importance of Skinner's naturalistic and materialistic as
sumptions is that they greatly limit the kinds of assumptions he can
hold concerning the human mind and knowledge. If the universe is
mere matter, then so is man; the human mind is only a by-product
of functioning matter. If matter is ruled by laws of cause and effect,
then man, who is only matter, must behave in a completely deter
mined way. If the universe is only material, then Skinner can place
great confidence in knowledge by empiricism, since there is noth
ing out there that is not potentially within the grasp of sensory
experience.
Given Skinner's naturalistic, materialistic picture of reality, he
is almost bound by consistency to believe that man is only matter,
completely determined, and that scientific methods can reveal all
truth about human nature. Notice that data in the laboratory have
not convinced Skinner of these behavioristic views. He adheres to
behaviorism first and foremost because of his materialistic and
naturalistic assumptions.
Empiricism and Materialism in Man
Though Skinner believes in the material nature of the human
being, (as opposed to the dualism of mind and body), he does not
deny the existence of inner feelings, sensations, or thoughts. He
seeks instead to clarify the nature of these functions. To Skinner
these mental states are a product of environmental conditioning. He
has said (1953):
The objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that
they are not relevant in a functional analysis. . . . The external
variables of which behavior is a function provide for what may
be called a causal or functional analysis, (p. 35)
Skinner believes that almost all behavior and what we call "personhood" is learned by the build-up of associations. As an empiricist,
then, he is saying that personality is a product of environmental
conditioning plus some relatively minor genetic predisposition. To
Skinner, personality theory is just a branch of learning theory.
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The following quotes from Skinner further reflect his mate
rialistic view of the person:
The picture which emerges from a scientific analysis is not of a
body with a person inside, but of a body which is a person in the
sense that it displays a complex repertoire of behavior. (1971,
p. 190)
A person is not an originating agent; he is a locus, a point at
which many genetic and environmental conditions come to
gether in a joint effect. (1974, p. 185)
A behavioristic analysis rests on the following assumption: A
person is first of all an organism, a member of a species and a
subspecies, possessing a genetic endowment of anatomical and
physiological characteristics, which are the product of con
tingencies of survival to which the species has been exposed in
the process of evolution. The organism becomes a person as it
acquires a repertoire of behavior under the contingencies of
reinforcement to which it is exposed during its lifetime. The be
havior it exhibits at any one moment is under the control of a
current setting. (1974, p. 228)
Though Skinner believes in the existence of internal mental states
and accepts some genetic influence over the behavior of an indi
vidual, he works from a strongly empirical, materialistic perspective
of human nature.

Determinism in Man
Skinner believes that human behavior is basically environ
mentally determined. He believes that the same regularity that de
scribes the physical world will also describe man. The laws deM rihing human behavior are to be found in environmental factors.
\\ bile Skinner admits that the research scientist is still in no position
to 4,ite unequivocally that man is completely determined by his
environment, he believes this is a worthwhile scientific assumption
' at future scientific findings will continue to validate.
(Observe Skinner's own words:
The uork is mechanistic in the sense of implying a fundamental
awtu ness or order in the behavior of organisms . . . but it is
•issu'ii
that behavior is predictable from a knowledge of rele<>s anc' 's ^ree from the intervention of any capricious
' .
agent. (1938, p. 433)
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When all relevant variables have been arranged, an or
ganism will or will not respond. If it does not, it cannot. If it can,
it will. To ask whether someone can turn a handspring is merely
to ask whether there are circumstances under which he will do
so. (1953, p. 112)
Personal exemption from a complete determinism is re
voked as a scientific analysis progresses, particularly in ac
counting for the behavior of the individual. (1971, p. 18)
It is in the nature of an experimental analysis of human
behavior that it should strip away the functions previously as
signed to autonomous man and transfer them one by one to the
controlling environment. (1971, p. 189)
While Skinner does not accept the mechanistic, reflex-learning
model of Pavlov and Watson, he still believes in a complete deter
minism of human behavior.

Behaviorism and Reductionism
Skinner operates on the assumption that behaviors, not internal
states, are the only acceptable data for a scientific psychology. To
be truly empirical, psychology must exclude any dependent vari
able that cannot be directly observed. Since stimuli in the environ
ment can be manipulated and operationally defined, whereas con
cepts like self, or ego, or the unconscious cannot, only behaviors
and observable stimuli should constitute the subject matter of psy
chology. When psychologists attempt to study internal states instead
of behavior, Skinner (1953) believes they are looking in the wrong
place for the causes of human behavior.
The practice of looking inside the organism for an explanation of
behavior has tended to obscure the variables which are im
mediately available for scientific analysis. These variables lie
outside the organism, in its immediate environment and in its
environmental history, (p. 31)
In order to scientifically study human behavior Skinner be
lieves that the research must take place in the controlled environ
ment of the laboratory. In addition, in order to meaningfully ma
nipulate variables, the scientist must concentrate on simple rather
than complex aspects of behavior. One can build toward explaining
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the complex through a study of the simple. It is also assumed by
Skinner that the laws of behavior apply to both humans and animals
in the same way. Therefore, he has made extensive use of rats and
pigeons in the lab although he agrees that we need to confirm at
least some of these findings on human subjects. Because of this
methodology and his basic assumptions Skinner has been criticized
as being reductionistic (MacKay, 1974). Skinner (1974) reacts
against this claim, however, by denying that separate levels of de
scription of human nature exist.
But behaviorism does not move from one dimensional system to
another. It simply provides an alternative account of the same
facts. It does not reduce feelings to bodily states; it simply argues
that bodily states are and always have been what are felt. It does
not reduce thought processes to behavior; it simply analyzes the
behavior previously explained by the invention of thought proc
esses. It does not reduce morality to certain features of the social
environment; it simply insists that those features have always
been responsible for moral behavior, (p. 265)

This last quotation clearly identifies Skinner's brand of behaviorism.
Skinner's behaviorism is not methodological behaviorism, which
says that behaviorism is only a model that directs research in human
and animal learning. Methodological behaviorism admits to the
existence of important internal events in human beings, but says
that they cannot be studied scientifically, and therefore that they are
outside the domain of psychology. Skinner's radical behaviorism,
on the other hand, denies the ultimate importance of the human
mind by saying that it is merely the production of environmental
events.
Skinner's Psychology

Skinner's assumptions make his psychological views very
clear. His personality theory cannot have any structural concepts
like Freud's "ego," or Rogers's "ideal self," or Eysenck's "traits."
Such structures relate to relatively enduring qualities of organiza
tion, whereas the behavioral approach emphasizes the importance
of stimuli in the environment.
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Growth and development (in the behavioral framework) are
directly related to stimuli and behavior. For example, children be
come more self-reliant through the reinforcement (food or praise) of
behavior in which they take care of themselves. A child becomes
emotionally mature through the occasional reinforcement of a sta
ble response during which a child learns to tolerate delays in
gratification.
In dealing with psychopathology Skinner considers symptoms
with underlying causes as superfluous, since behavioral pathology
is not a disease. There is no unconscious or "sick" personality.
Pathological behavior is a response pattern learned in the same way
as "normal" response patterns. If you can change the maladaptive
response, you have removed the pathology. Psychological prob
lems are merely failures in learning a proper response, or learning
normal responses under the control of inappropriate reinforcers.
Depression is seen as a lowered response rate. Schizophrenics
might be individuals who attend to unusual cues in the environment
because they are out of touch with conditions of reinforcement.
Lack of emotion might be a lack of responsiveness to normal social
stimuli. The job of the therapist is to deal with target behaviors, not
neuroses.
In summary, this chapter has analyzed the guiding assumptions
behind the work of B. F. Skinner. The examination of these assump
tions provides a helpful background and foundation for under
standing his scientific research.

TME SCIENTIFIC
FOUNDnTION

This chapter will briefly reant conditioning and its acthat we can begin our evaluaclear understanding of his scientific
produces.
OPERANT CONDITIONING

view Skinner's theory of oper
companying technology so
tion of his behaviorism with a
methodology and the data it

We will begin by distinguishing
operant conditioning from classi
cal conditioning and also from contiguity theories of learning. These
differences will necessitate a slight change in the typical behavioristic S-R designation when describing Skinner's behaviorism.
In classical conditioning, responses are elicited by known stimuli;
the response is known as a respondent. The knee jerk in response to
a tap on the patellar tendon and the pupillary constriction in re
sponse to light are examples. Responses that are spontaneously
emitted by an organism without any correlation with known stimuli
are called operants. Operants usually acquire a relationship with
preceding stimuli. They are not elicited by the stimuli, but are
33
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emitted by the organism. Most human behavior is operant in nature.
When the operant behavior emitted by the organism is made to
occur regularly by the use of reinforcement, the process is called
operant conditioning.1
There is also a difference between "merely associationistic"
theories, which are known as contiguity theories, and Skinner's
"more than associationistic" theory, which emphasizes reinforce
ment. E. R. Guthrie proposed a contiguity theory in which stimuli
come to have their eliciting powers by association with responses
and by association with each other. Skinner's reinforcement theory,
on the other hand, incorporates the operation of reinforcement as a
means of accounting for the formation of associations. The con
tiguity theory does not require such reinforcement.
With these differences briefly outlined between classical and
operant conditioning and between contiguity and reinforcement
theories, it can be seen that Skinner's operant conditioning theory is
not just an ordinary S-R theory. The simple S-R designation often
means that reinforcement is not a factor in the association of stimuli
with responses, and the stimulus is eliciting the response. But in
Skinner's theory an emitted response may occur in a particular
stimulus context, but the stimuli are not the cause of the response.
The reinforcement is seen as the controlling factor in the response of
the organism. Therefore, instead of S-R, Skinner would prefer his
theory to be simplified by Sd-R-Srein, where Sd represents the dis
criminating stimulus, R the emitted behavior, and Srein the reinforc
ing stimulus.
Operant Conditioning and Reinforcement
Operant conditioning simply defined means that if an operant
behavior is followed by the presentation of a reinforcing stimulus,
the strength of the behavior is increased. The classic example of
operant conditioning is that of a rat in an operant test chamber,
more commonly known as a "Skinner Box" (a name that Skinner
The difference between operant and classical conditioning is not considered as
sharp now as it once was (Hilgard and Bower, 1975, pp. 209-12), but the distinction
does serve to help clarify Skinner's theory.
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did not invent and detests). If a hungry rat is reinforced with food
pellets when it presses a bar in its cage, bar pressing behavior will
increase.
FIGURE

4

An operant test chamber (Skinner Box). Photo courtesy of B. F. Skinner.

A reinforcer therefore, is a stimulus that follows a response and
increases the probability of its recurring. The reinforcer strengthens
the behavior it follows. Skinner has refused to biologize the concept
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of reinforcement; he has refused to "explain" what makes reinforcers reinforcing. He does not invoke homeostatic concepts like
drives, wants, hungers, and the like. What he does insist on is a
psychology that describes the functional relationships between be
haviors and environmental stimuli.
In operant conditioning reinforcement does not appear until
after the appropriate response is emitted. Therefore, it is said that
reinforcement is contingent upon that response. The contingencies
of reinforcement so often spoken of by Skinner are the rules gov
erning the relationship between responses and reinforcement.
Superstitious behavior is an example of conditioning in which there
are no systematic contingencies.
Reinforcements may be of several types: primary or secondary,
positive or negative, continuous or partial. Primary, or uncon
ditioned reinforcement, is the reward to which an organism "natur
ally" responds. Food, water, sex, comfort, and freedom from pain
are the usual primary reinforcers. Secondary or conditioned rein
forcement is a formerly neutral stimulus that has become reinforcing
because of its repeated association with a stimulus that is reinforc
ing. Secondary reinforcers will lose their reinforcing effects when
repeatedly applied to a response for which there is no eventual
primary reinforcement. Skinner would see stimuli such as money
and praise as extremely effective secondary reinforcers.
Positive reinforcement is any reinforcement that increases the
probability of the recurrence of the preceding response. Notice that
the term reinforcement is being defined in terms of its behavioral
effects. Any attempt to specify what is reinforcing on other grounds
such as need reduction is not of interest to Skinner. In particular the
physiological mechanisms involved are not a necessary part of the
science of behavior. Negative reinforcement is an unpleasant or
aversive stimulus, which, when removed, increases the probability
of the recurrence of the preceding response. This brings to mind the
joke about one man asking another why he was beating himself
over the head with a brick. The man's answer was, "Because it feels
so good when I quit." This illustration serves to distinguish negative
reinforcement from punishment. Negative reinforcement is rein-
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forcing and serves to increase the probability of the recurrence of
preceding behavior. Punishment, on the other hand, decreases the
probability of a response. However, Skinner feels that the effect of
punishment is temporary and appears to be of little value in
eliminating behavior. For this reason he has emphasized only posi
tive and negative reinforcement.
Continuous reinforcement is reinforcement that is associated
with every response of the organism. Partial reinforcement is some
times called intermittent reinforcement because not every response
is followed by a reinforcer. Skinner discovered the effectiveness of
this type of reinforcement quite by accident. Being low on food
pellets one day, he set up his animal apparatus for partial rein
forcement, and even more responding was observed. One final term
related to the concept of reinforcement is extinction. When a be
havior is no longer followed by a reinforcement, that behavior will
weaken and eventually stop. The rate of this extinction is a function
of the past history of reinforcement for that behavior.
THE CONDITIONING
OF COMPLEX BEHAVIOR

It is easy to see how operant conditioning works in simple behavior like
bar pressing. The animal makes a re
sponse, is reinforced and subsequently learns to make that response
with increasing frequency. Understanding how operant condition
ing works with complex behaviors is more difficult since there are
many behaviors that one would never expect to be emitted spon
taneously and therefore could never be reinforced. You might, for
example, expect your dog to chase cars, but it is doubtful that he
would ever spontaneously get your slippers and lay them beside
your easy chair. How, therefore, can reinforcement be applied to
this complex behavior? The answer is found in the concepts of
shaping and chaining.
Shaping is the conditioning of a complex behavior by rein
forcing gradual approximations of that desired response. In our
example of the dog and your slippers, for example, you might begin
to produce slipper-getting behavior by at first reinforcing any
movement of the dog in the direction of the slippers. Then, withhold

38 • B. F. SKINNER'S BEHAVIORISM
reinforcement until the dog emits a few steps toward the slippers.
Then, again withhold reinforcement until it is sniffing and pushing
at the slippers. In this way you are gradually shaping the dog's
behavior toward the desired response.
Another way complex behavior can be produced by operant
conditioning is by the method of response chaining. In chaining, a
sequence of individual behavioral responses is assembled into a
performance unit. The successive stimuli in the chain act as descriminative stimuli for responding in their presence and as secon
dary reinforcers for the responses that precede them. An example of
a chained response is the complex sequence of behaviors that cir
cus animals perform. Each of the individual behaviors that consti
tute the eventual "act" are reinforced and then are linked with
others to compose the total response.
APPLICATIONS
The applications of the principles
OF SKINNER'S BEHAVIORISM of operant conditioning have
been numerous and varied. Op
erant conditioning has been used to speed up animal learning,
improve patient behavior in psychiatric wards, improve school
learning, cure problems like stuttering and bed wetting, remove
disruptive or delinquent behavior, teach the self-control of un
wanted habits, and do other useful things.
One of Skinner's most novel applications was the teaching
machine and programmed learning in the field of education. While
teaching machines have not replaced teachers, they and pro
grammed learning texts are widely used today. Although Skinner
did not invent the teaching machine, which was patented over
one-hundred years ago, he did give us its modern form. The teach
ing machine emphasizes immediate reinforcement when a correct
response is emitted by a student; it helps shape complex responses.
The modern teaching machine consists of a window to display
questions or statements in which a word has been left out. After a
question is asked, the student must write in an answer, and then pull
a ever to reveal the correct answer. Reinforcement is obtained
because the machine then moves ahead to the next question. If the
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student is correct, he or she moves to the next item.
In therapy, behavior modification techniques based upon op
erant conditioning have been used extensively to cure obesity,
asthma, stuttering, phobias, anti-social acts, marital difficulties,
depression, alcoholism, drug addiction, fetishism, auditory halluci
nations, schizophrenic behavior, childhood autism, mental retar
dation, and other pathological behaviors. The list seems almost
endless. In general, behavior modification proceeds by arranging
contingencies in the environment so that undesirable behavior is
not reinforced but desirable behavior is. This may sound simple, but
the identification and manipulation of relevant reinforcing agents in
the existing environment can be exceedingly difficult.
Language skills have also been effectively taught to autistic
children using behavior modification techniques. Prompts, food,
and praise reinforcements have been used very effectively to shape
these children's attending behavior and simple vocalizations into
into meaningful language.
Behavior modification principles have been applied to large
groups of individuals by the use of token economies, techniques in
which tokens, such as plastic chips or credit cards that can be
punched, act as secondary reinforcers that can be converted into
primary reinforcers. The system, which can generally only be
applied in highly controlled environmental settings like hospitals,
prisons, or classrooms, usually operates on a contract basis and the
person is informed of what behavior is expected for the tokens.
Some economies even require tokens for meals! Other large scale
applications of behavior modification techniques are occurring
today in the form of reinforcements given for car pooling or the
control of littering.
At this time the application of operant conditioning principles
to the whole of society is speculative and Utopian, and because of
the difficulties involved in such applications, they might forever
remain mere speculations. Skinner, however, is hopeful and has
outlined the potential for the behavioral management of an entire
society in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), and Walden Two
(1948). Walden Two makes very interesting reading for students of
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human behavior but it is not terribly exciting as a novel, since like
most Utopian books, it has no plot; it is basically a guided tour and
lecture. In the book Skinner's alter-ego and designer of Walden
Two, Frazier, discusses the details of the behaviorally managed
community and the dreams of applying such principles to entire
nations and even the world.
Some of Skinner's optimism concerning the use of the princi
ples of behaviorism for the management of society can be seen in
the fact that Walden Two was written shortly after the "pigeons in a
pelican" project was terminated. Skinner (1961) comments on this:
In the year which followed the termination of Project Pigeon I
wrote Walden Two, a Utopian picture of a properly engineered
society. Some psychotherapists might argue that I was suffering
from personal rejection and simply retreated to a fantasied world
where everything went according to plan, and where there never
was heard a discouraging word. But another explanation is, I
think, equally plausible. That piece of science fiction was a dec
laration of confidence in a technology of behavior. Call it a
crackpot idea if you will; it is one in which I have never lost faith.
I still believe that the same kind of wide-ranging speculation
about human affairs, supported by studies of compensatory rigor,
will make a substantial contribution toward that world of the
future in which, among other things, there will be no need for
guided missiles, (p. 426.18)

Having briefly presented the major features of Skinner's be
haviorism and its application, we will now begin both a more
thorough presentation and critical analysis of these ideas. Chapter 4
will begin our evaluation by looking at some of the general sci
entific problems Skinner's behaviorism presents.

THE SCIENTIFIC LIMITS

One of the greatest difficulties
in evaluating Skinner's theoretical perspectives is that of
deciding what the grounds of
the evaluation will be. Most of
Skinner's critics do not quar
rel with his scientific methods or his data, but rather with the
philosophical weaknesses and the broader attempts at applying his
behavioristic theory to complex human functioning. Specifically,
Skinner's critics have suggested that behavioristic methods can
never give an adequate view of human nature and that it is impossi
ble to generalize and apply to human principles of behavior ob
served in simple animals. Skinner responds to such philosophical
criticisms by saying that his science is being misunderstood. There
fore Skinner sets up a dichotomy between science and philosophy.
Unfortunately, when this happens it seems that we are forced
to choose between the clear, objective data of the scientific labora
tory, and obtuse, ancient, armchair speculation. Given this as a
choice, of course, many people feel impelled to go along with what
science has purportedly proven about human nature rather than
accept religious or philosophical viewpoints. The position taken by
this author is that the dichotomy is artificial, and that it is not only
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feasible but actually essential that our scientific work be carried out
within the framework of one or more broad philosophical or reli
gious views of reality and human nature.
The best scientist is the one who knows what the scientific tools
can or cannot do. Therefore, it is scientific criticism to look care
fully at the limits of Skinner's scientific methods as well as at its
contributions. It is essential to ask philosophical questions because
all science is carried out in the midst of philosophical assumptions
and speculations. The data one selects for study, the subjects one
uses, the problems studied, and the methods used to study problems
all reflect basic assumptions and religious and philosophical per
spectives. If one is a poor philosopher, or if the philosophical un
derpinning of one's scientific endeavors are not made explicit, then
that person's science is bound by the same poverty.
This chapter will focus on three perceived limits to Skinner's
behaviorism as a science: (1) the limits of empirical, behavioristic
methods in studying human nature, (2) the limits of generalizations
from simple behaviors and animal subjects, and (3) the limits of a
behaviorism that has historically isolated itself from most other
forms of psychology.
THE LIMITS OF
BEHAVIORISTIC KNOWLEDGE

In analyzing a scientific system
of thought it is of value to ask

questions regarding the par
ticulars of the method of knowing in that system. The method of
knowing chosen by the behaviorist is empiricism, knowledge solely
from sensory experience. This choice obviously has much to com
mend it since behavior can be observed, whereas thought or emo
tions cannot be so directly studied. The question asked here, however, is, What kind of restrictions has behaviorism placed on itself
by limiting the study of human nature to the study of human be
havior?
The Positivist Approach
Skinner (1938) has defined the epistemological roots of his own
system as positivistic.
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So far as scientific method is concerned, the system set up in the
preceding chapter is as follows. It is positivistic. It confines itself
to description rather than explanation, (p. 44)

Positivism is a philosophical position intended to set limits to
philosophical inquiry and thus avoid meaningless discussion.
Positivism says that only statements that have meaning, that is, those
that can be empirically verified through sense experience, are worth
discussing. The statement, "There is oxygen in this jar," is mean
ingful because it can be verified empirically. However, the state
ment, "Adultery is immoral," is meaningless because it cannot be
empirically verified. In fact, according to positivism, statements
about God, mind, evil, freedom, wrong, and other similar subjects
are in this meaningless category, and consequently, it would be a
waste of time and effort to discuss them.
One major problem with positivism is that it destroys itself by
its own definition of what constitutes a meaningless statement. The
basic proposition of positivism is, Only factual statements that can
be verified by sense experience are meaningful; any other kind of
statement is meaningless jibberish. According to this proposition,
positivism is meaningless jibberish since its basic proposition can
not be verified by a sense experience! This is similar to a teacher
trying to communicate that all communication is impossible; in the
very act of communicating the theory, the teacher would negate it.
Positivism also negates itself in that, if it is true that empirically
unverifiable statements are meaningless, then the statements of
positivism itself must also be meaningless, since they cannot be
empirically verified.
A second criticism of positivism that relates to a problem with
Skinner's positivistic behaviorism is that positivism represents a
self-imposed intellectual ignorance. So much of reality is beyond
discussion or study, that we are in danger of limiting our study to the
trivial. The great themes of life, religion, value, purpose, and evil are
relegated from discussion. In behaviorism the activities of persons
may be studied, but the essence of humanity is lost from view by
this positivistic influence.
Empiricism and behaviorism are obviously related to positivis-
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tic thinking in that they, too, are self-imposed intellectual restric
tions. The empiricist says we can only learn truth by sense experi
ence. Some more radical formulations of empiricism state that the
only reality that exists is that which is empirically verifiable. In
terestingly, there is no way to empirically verify this statement! It has
to be accepted on faith. We should be very skeptical of any system
that contradicts itself in its own explanation of reality.
Beginning the study of psychology with such a hard-headed
empirical approach is often considered essential and very scientific.
Actually, the statements made by radical empiricism might be con
sidered unscientific when the inherent dogma is considered and
contrasted with the humility that should characterize the scientific
search. Ftiilosopher Elton Trueblood reflected on this idea (Trueblood, 1973):
. . . science at its best is very humble in the face of nature and the
ultimate mysteries. Science asks questions and accepts evidence
of all kinds without judging the situation in advance. To say that
we cannot know objective reality except by means of sense
experience is clearly to prejudge the case. It is, therefore, unsci" entific. (p. 197)

The Behavioristic Approach
Skinner's behaviorism also suffers the danger of being consid
ered unscientific because, in the effort to make sure that he knows
something about human nature that is without error, Skinner may
have left himself with very little knowledge of human nature at all.
Limiting the study of human nature to the study of human behavior
precludes ever getting a complete picture. In fact, it has left the
psychology books with discussions that relate very little to human
nature. Topics such as human motivation, thinking, creativity, sub
conscious, emotion, aspiration, prejudice, and others are essentially
lost to the behaviorist; to say that they do not exist is to prejudge the
case. Redefining these elements of human nature in terms of human
behavior may aid in understanding them, but descriptions of the
relationship of certain behaviors to environmental contingencies
falls short of explaining their nature and origin. Skinner's discus-
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sions about the contents and operations of the mind, the nature of
freedom, and personality are limited by the behaviors and reinforc
ing stimuli he can observe. It is no wonder that he fails to find
"person" and "freedom"; his method cannot measure such things.
When he says that these do not exist, he is failing to recognize the
limits of his method of knowing.
Operationalism
Psychology's method for achieving empirical descriptions of
psychological subject matter is through the use of operational
definitions. An operantional definition is a definition in terms of
some easily identifiable behavioral operation; it is usually quantifi
able. Psychological research could not be conducted without the
use of operational definitions, but the same research is limited to the
validity of its operational terms. For example, instead of dealing
with the nebulous concept of love in an experiment, a researcher
might define ten dates with the same person or sexual intimacy as
love. An angry person could be operationally identified by that
person's harsh words. One of the difficulties with operational terms
is the frequent need to operationally define the operational defini
tions. What exactly is meant by a date? Does an unplanned meeting
in the park qualify? What is meant by harsh words? Is a swear word
indicative of anger or disappointment? And might not the same
word have different meanings and communicate different emo
tional states for different people at different times? The fact that there
are numerous definitions of anxiety is a case in point. One re
searcher may operationally define anxiety through the use of MMPI
scales, while another may define it in terms of the measurement of
the Galvanic Skin Response. And these two different measures of
anxiety may correlate little with each other!
A more pertinent question about operational terms concerns
the behavioral definition's ability to specify the nature of a psycho
logical phenomenon. When psychological phenomena are defined
in terms of observable behaviors, something of the essence of what
is being defined is lost. When a behaviorist summarizes his research
in a textbook by saying that love is a product of the environment, he
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is really saying that his operational definition of love is a product of
the environment. The value of psychological research depends
upon how close a relationship actually exists between the mental
event and the behavioral definition of the mental event.
Since human mental states are so difficult to define operation
ally, many behaviorists simply refuse to study psychological vari
ables, saying that they cannot be empirically investigated. A behaviorist, therefore, ought to be agnostic about his ability to study
the existence, meaning, and importance of internal mind states. If
the internal state that is of interest is undefinable, then it cannot be
studied or related to the environment.
Skinner, however, is not at all agnostic about human mental
states! He assumes that his behavioral definitions of mental states
are equal to the supposed psychological states. In this way he can
claim to be an authority on such states and still remain an empiri
cist. But, with this approach Skinner is assuming the very thing that
he says his science is proving, that is, he assumes that mental states
are unimportant correlates of behaviors, and then after much re
search on mental states (subject behaviors), he declares that mental
states are merely behaviors.
This discussion of operational definitions and behaviorism was
not meant to criticize their use in psychology, for they are essential.
But we must recognize their limits and realize that our experi
mentation and theorizing is only as accurate as our operational
definitions; the definitions must define reality. Skinner's definitions
of mental phenomena are potentially far removed from human
emotions and thinking, and therefore, his research results lose some
of their explanatory power.
Noam Chomsky, an open critic of Skinner's behaviorism, has
pointed out an example of behaviorism's problem with operational
e initions. The concept of reinforcement is defined by the beaviorist as any stimulus that can act to increase the probability of a
recurrence of a response of an organism. This is a circular definition
at serves to protect the operant conditioning model from ever
being shown to be incorrect. If a behaviorist is asked why an animal
or human failed to respond in the presence of a reinforcing stimulus
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(i.e., Might your theory be wrong?), the answer given is that it is
obvious that the stimulus was not a reinforcer for this orgnaism
because the organism failed to respond. But, this is again a case of
assuming in one's operational definition what one wants to show,
and it completely removes the possibility that the theory can be
proven wrong. If a food reward fails to increase a rat s behavior,
rather than doubting the truth of operant conditioning theory the
behaviorist merely has to say that it is obvious (since operant condi
tioning theory is true) that the food couldn't have been a reinforcer
in this case, or otherwise the rat would have performed. But what
we are trying to determine is whether or not reinforcement does
control behavior, therefore, the behaviorist shouldnt assume that
reinforcement does control behavior in his very definition of rein
forcement. This is clearly a case of assuming in one's argument the
very point to be proven. In other words, the behaviorist assumes in
his operational definition of reinforcement the truth of operant con
ditioning theory. This is not good science. If a theory is not falsifiable, it is no longer an acceptable scientific theory. Chomsky (1959)
summarizes this point with respect to verbal behavior.
It seems that Skinner's claim that all verbal behavior is acquired
and maintained in "strength" through reinforcement is quite
empty, because his notion of reinforcement has no clear content,
functioning only as a cover term for any factor, detectable or not,
related to the acquisition or maintenance of behavior, (p. 226)
THE LIMITS OF GENERALIZING
FROM THE SIMPLE
AND THE ANIMAL

There is most certainly a place
in psychology for the investigation of simple behaviors
before proceding to complex

ones. A valid case can also be made for using animals as subjects
and generalizing some of the findings to humans. Studying simp e
behaviors and using animal subjects in experimentation a"°w or a
greater degree of control than is possible with complex varia es or
human subjects. There is a serious question, however, about t e
heavy reliance Skinner has placed upon the investigation of simp e
animal behaviors as a basis for his philosophical pronouncements
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about the nature of human freedom, motivation, learning, psychopathology, and so forth. Skinner's willingness to generalize far be
yond the data was seen in his first book. Despite the fact that it was
almost exclusively about rats in bar pressing situations, it was called
The Behavior of Organisms. While there has been some operant
conditioning research done on higher animals and humans, it is
quite clear that it has not been Skinner's priority to extend his re
search efforts into complex variables and on human subjects before
announcing discoveries about human nature.
Skinner, however, assumes that any complex behavior, even a
human behavior, is composed of an assemblage of simpler be
haviors that can be shown to be learned by operant conditioning.
He also assumes that the principles of learning found in the animal,
particularly the rat and the pigeon, are identical to the principles of
learning behind all human behavior. He says in his own defense
(Skinner, 1974), "Enough has been done to suggest that the same
basic processes occur in both animals and men" (p. 250).
The problem with these two assumptions is that Skinner is
again assuming the very points that are in question. Skinner as
sumes that complex human behaviors are just an assemblage of
simple behaviors. For this reason he confines his studies to simple
animal behaviors, and then feels perfectly safe to generalize his
animal results to explain complex human behaviors. What is
needed is research to shed light on this question and not pro
nouncements to the effect that science has demonstrated the behaviorist's model of human nature! First, there should be extensive
research on the operant conditioning of primates to determine if the
basic principles formulated on rats and pigeons remain valid. Sec
ond, though it is difficult, more behavioristic research needs to be
done on humans to isolate the supposed controlling primary and
secondary reinforcers responsible for complex human functions,
such as creative, verbal, and moral behaviors.
It is essential to realize that Skinner has not made a scientific
discovery to the effect that all human behavior is the product of
environmental conditioning. He has hardly studied humans or the
behaviors most in question. He has run very selective experiments
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showing conditioning, has made no attempt to design an experi
ment to disprove his basic thesis on human nature, and it is doubtful
that any human data produced could not be reduced to his ambigu
ous behavioristic language explaining it away. Consequently there
are serious doubts about his "scientific" discovery that all the ac
complishments of human life from simple, physical reflexes to the
construction of a poem could be successfully reduced to bits of
operantly conditioned behavior. Skinner is safest in his assumptions
about human behavior when he talks about behaviors also seen in
the rat, and least safe in the areas of private human mental life that
we cannot directly investigate.
Skinner's generalizations from research are also limited by the
experimental situations and equipment he has chosen to concen
trate on. The tightly controlled environment of the Skinner Box
greatly limits the range of behaviors a rat can demonstrate. There
are very few responses that the Skinner Box is equipped to record.
The responses one chooses to observe in an animal dictate a great
deal of the kind of theory one can hold in psychology. Tolman and
Kohler's research on animal learning broadened the environmental
context in which animals could operate; they learned that certain
animal behavior was not at all related to the contingencies of rein
forcement in the history of the animal but rather to variables like
insight and cognitive maps.
Learning psychologist James McConnell (1977) has written a
short science fiction story about a learning theorist who was cap
tured and transferred to a spaceship. His captors were alien psy
chologists who planned to observe him as an "animal" specimen.
They placed him in a research box to see if all of their favorite
learning theories would describe his behavior. As this human
learning theorist was traveling through space going who knows
where, his captors were conducting operant conditioning experi
ments on him. He was terribly frustrated by this situation because
the restrictiveness of the experimental apparatus and the food de
privation virtually guaranteed that he would perform according to
conditioning theory. He had no way to demonstrate his advanced
cognitive abilities. He also realized that if he did make his abilities
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known, he would no longer be performing according to theory and
might be sacrificed as a "sick" specimen.
McConnell's story is only fiction, but, according to E. C. Tolman, rats in different circumstances can show cognitive approaches
to learning. In a very real sense the whole of human nature is limited
by what Skinner's subjects can do in his box of empirical restric
tions.
THE LIMITS OF AN
ISOLATED BEHAVIORISM

Another major problem for behaviorism is Skinner's unwillingness to
work through some of the solid data
and theories of other psychologies that run counter to his own. The
reason is not that Skinner is unaware of the other theories and data,
but that behaviorism is limited, in the interests of being "scientific,"
to a particular view of human nature and knowledge; no serious
consideration is given to other scientific areas of psychology.
Psychology in the form of behaviorism won the hard-fought
battle to become an empirical science by initially rejecting the in
trospection of Wundt and the rationalistic concepts of Wertheimer's
Cestalt psychology. So, too, today when any competing psycho
logical system utilizes methods that are less empirical than be
haviorism, or invokes explanations with a rationalistic or mentalistic leaning, they are simply ignored. The scientific "objectivity" ofbehaviorism has been won at the expensive price of isolation from
most nonbehavioristic systems including physiological psychology.
Daniel Robinson (1979) in his excellent treatment of systems of
modern psychology, described this problem of Skinner's be
haviorism this way:
The problem is that as a purely descriptive enterprise with official
sanctions against biological and cognitive theorizing, it is not
equipped even in principle to embrace such subjects and pro
cesses. (p. 140)

The problem for Skinner is that a massive amount of scientific
research in other areas of psychology supports a more rationalistic
picture of man. Well-established areas like Piaget's stage theory,
Cestalt psychology, Tolman's purposive behaviorism and modern
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cognitive psychology, Karl Lashley's principle of mass action in
physiological psychology, studies in ethology, and Chomsky's lan
guage development theory all speak out against the associationistic,
empirical model of man in Skinner's radical behaviorism. Skinner's
behaviorism faces the pressure to change, since it is difficult to
reduce all of these kinds of data to a behavioristic system. Skinner
does not come to terms with these psychologies simply because his
system must reject the kinds of theoretical constructs they use. In the
next chapter I will consider the data and theories of some of these
psychologies that run counter to Skinner's behaviorism.
Skinner's behaviorism also fails to explain some additional
findings of operant conditioning experiments. For example, two
former associates of Skinner, Keller and Marion Breland, used their
training in operant conditioning to establish an animal training
business. In 1960 they published a whimsical paper in the Ameri
can Psychologist entitled, "The Misbehavior of Organisms," which
detailed the contingencies of reinforcement that did not succeed
entirely in controlling what the animals did. Animals often did
things they were not reinforced for. These "misbehaviors" seemed
to be species-specific, food-related behaviors. It appears that mem
bers of a species are instinctively "prepared" to make certain
learned attachments. In another article entitled "Learning
Theory—Two Trials and Tribulations," Freedman, Cohen, and
Hennessy (1974) reversed the hypothesis of Skinner and showed
that a behavior followed by a reinforcement is likely not to be
repeated. This kind of data needs to be seriously considered in
evaluating the adequacy of Skinner's model of learning.
Another problem with Skinner's model of operant conditioning
is his emphasis on proximate external consequences as controllers
of behavior. Countless human studies have demonstrated that con
sequences do not have to be immediate for humans to learn. Be
cause a human being represents things symbolically he is able to
bring his behavior under the control of distant consequences
through anticipatory thought. The principles of observational
learning have been well established (Bandura, 1971) and illustrate
that humans and animals can learn with delayed reinforcement
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because they are able to "hold" learning as a central event rather
than as a peripheral event tied up in some musculature response.
None of these kinds of findings are anticipated by the principles of
operant conditioning.
SUMMARY

In conclusion, it seems that while certain aspects of
Skinner's behaviorism pose significant problems, his
system is so exclusive that it attempts to exclude all possible criti
cism. Skinner's scientific work has clearly amassed a great deal of
data and contributed immensely to our understanding of behavior,
especially animal behavior. He clearly deserves the recognition he
has received as one of the foremost psychological scientists of this
century.
When Skinner theorizes about the meaning of his data, how
ever, he repeatedly makes grand inferences about human behavior
from studies of animals. His methods, by their very nature, exclude
observations about unique, human experiences (if such, in fact,
exist!). His "science" has also been conducted within a circular,
theoretical logic that rules out the possibility of change in the light
of other theories and data. Consequently Skinner's science has a
tendency to become scientism; he has traded the humility of
knowledge for the rigidity of dogma.

THE QUESTION OF MIND

In addition to the problems
that arise because of Skinner's
generalization and applica- E[ t'on
animal responses to
human behavior and the limitations of his methodology
for studying complex human functions, another problem has
plagued S-R psychologies since the days of Watson. That problem is
the mounting evidence for the existence of important, inner,
controlling, mental or cognitive states in human beings. These states
alter stimuli and help generate responses. In other words, quite
apart from religious and philosophical views on the nature of man,
there is psychological evidence that indicates that the control of the
person comes not only from the outside environment but also from
the inner person.
Problems for Watson's S-R psychology developed early when
Wertheimer published his findings on the phi phenomenon, and
when Gestalt psychology began its study of perceptual illusions.
The phi phenomenon is a simple illusion, in which two lights
blinking alternately appear as one light moving from side to side.
The problem with this observation for any S-R psychology is that the
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experience or response is obviously not just a function of the
stimulus input. In the physical world there are two blinking lights; in
the world of experience there is only one moving light. It is clear
that something must be intervening between stimulus and response
that actively changes the stimulus into the response observed. After
such demonstrations Gestalt psychologists felt that the important
variables in human behavior were internal and not external. Other
Gestalt examples are forms such as a square; Why are its four lines
seen as a square—something greater than the sum of the parts? Or,
consider the Muller-Lyer illusion. This well-known illusion involves
two horizontal lines of identical length; one has arrowheads that
point inward and the other has arrowheads that point outward. The
illusion is that the line with the inward pointing arrowheads is
decidedly longer. Again, the stimulus cannot be related to the re
sponse without positing an important, active, internal state that ma
nipulates stimulus input.
FIGURE 5

The Muller-Lyer illusion. The line with the outgoing arrowheads
appears to be longer than the line with the ingoing arrowheads.

The problems for S-R psychologists do not end with a few
illusions from Gestalt psychologists. The research of sensory psy
chology in areas as diverse as human pattern perception and social
perception has yielded the unshakeable thesis that one's perceptual
experience is only in a small way the product of the stimulus world.
The most important variables in perception have been shown to be
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memory, expectation, motivation, and attention. American be
haviorism has been further beleaguered by onslaughts from a di
verse number of research areas such as Wolfgang Kohler's insight
learning in apes, Jean Piaget's rationalistic stage theory, and Noam
Chomsky's nativistic evidences in language acquisition. Karl
Lashley's principle of mass action was a watershed principle, shift
ing physiological psychology away from associationistic, synaptic
theories of learning and memory. American behavioristic learning
theory itself was in a rapid movement toward the intervening vari
ables (i.e., variables between S and R) of Clark Hull's learning
theory, and the "purposive" behaviorism of E. C. Tolman, whose
discussion of cognitive maps and latent learning made psychol
ogists reconsider the "mind" of the rat.
This, then, was the psychological climate in which Skinner
developed a behaviorism rooted in the Watsonian empirical view of
human nature. Consequently, it has been of utmost importance for
Skinner to de-emphasize his theory's relationship with traditional
stimulus-response psychology. Since he emphasizes the concept of
reinforcement, Skinner considers his behaviorism to be not an S-R
psychology but an S-R-S psychology. More specifically it is an S d R-S rem psychology, in which S d is the discriminative stimulus and S' r "
is the reinforcing stimulus. Skinner holds that his theory is not an S-R
theory in the sense of a Watsonian theory of stimuli eliciting re
sponses. To Skinner the organism emits a response (in the context of
a stimulus environment), which is controlled by the following rein
forcing stimulus. This difference between Skinner and Watson is
clear, but the question remains how an S d -R-S re,n psychology avoids
the problem of explaining internal mental states as an important part
of the person. The only avenue open to Skinner is to include these
internal states as part of the R, that is, these internal thoughts, moti
vations, and feelings, that seem so obviously to have a role in
human behavior, are as much a product of the conditioning envi
ronment as the visible behaviors of the person.
We can summarize Skinner's position on this issue as follows:
Skinner's behaviorism says that all behavior is a product of the
environment. Other research, however, shows that internal vari-
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ables of mind play a major role in human behavior. Skinner then
counters that these mental variables, too, are shaped and controlled
by the environment according to principles of operant conditioning.
Because of the demonstrated limitation of S-R psychology,
Skinner has extended his theory to describe the conditioning of
internal mind states. While not denying the existence of internal
states, he has sought to reinterpret them and to set his views apart
from traditional S-R psychology. For this reason a great deal of the
content of Skinner's recent books has been devoted to the defense
of his position on mental phenomenon. In fact, his Science and
Human Behavior (1953), Verbal Behavior (1957), Beyond Freedom
and Dignity (1971), and About Behaviorism (1974) read like an
effort to save behaviorism from cognitive psychology. In the Preface
(June, 1966) to the seventh printing of The Behavior of Organisms
(1938), Skinner reviewed his approach to S-R psychology and cog
nitive variables quite clearly.
The Behavior of Organisms is often placed quite erroneously in
the S-R tradition. The book remains committed to the program
stated in my 1931 paper in which the stimulus occupied no
special place among the independent variables. The simplest
contingencies involve at least three terms—stimulus, response,
and reinforcer—and at least one other variable (the deprivation
associated with the reinforcer) is implied. This is very much more
than input and output, and when all relevant variables are thus
taken into account, there is no need to appeal to an inner ap
paratus, whether mental, psychological, or conceptual. The con
tingencies are quite enough to account for attending, remem
bering, learning, forgetting, generalizing, abstracting, and many
so called cognitive processes. In the same way, histories of satia
tion and deprivation take the place of internalized drives,
schedules of reinforcement account for sustained probabilities of
responding otherwise attributed to dispositions of traits and so
on. (p. xii)

While the evidence cited against Skinner's behaviorism has not
forced him to radically change his theory, it has, nonetheless forced
him to clarify it and to acknowledge that mental events have to be
explained. But the question remains, Can Skinner demonstrate that
all mental events are indeed a product of the environment?
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SKINNER'S VIEW OF THE MIND

Skinner's radical behaviorism
suggests that we can have di
rect access to internal mental events because they are controlled by
the same environmental contingencies that cause outward be
haviors. For Skinner, observable behavior (including physiological
responses) is the stuff of which internal states are constructed. First a
person responds, and then the physical bodily response and its
interpretation become the internal "mind state" of the person. By
studying the external behaviors responsible for internal states one
can learn about the internal states themselves. This viewpoint is
very closely related to the James-Lange theory of emotions, which
says that one's bodily feelings during autonomic nervous system
arousal are the emotions one experiences and learns to call mental
states.
Skinner does not deny the existence of inner emotions,
thoughts, or motivations, but he does seek to redefine them. Skinner
says that a thought is simply a sensing of one's own behavior.
Unfortunately, according to Skinner, we have for centuries mis
labeled these feelings as the "mind's content," and since we insist
on attributing behavior to this inner person, we resist any technol
ogy of behavior control. He writes (Skinner, 1974):
Feelings are not the causes of behavior. But what are the feelings
made of? We usually say mind. To get a child to eat we deprive
him of food (physical event) and then he feels hungry (mental
event) and then he eats (physical event). The question is how did
the food deprivation cause the feelings and how did those feel
ings cause behavior, (p. 11)

Thought, says Skinner (1957)
is simply behavior, verbal or nonverbal, covert or overt. It is not
some mysterious process responsible for behavior but the very
behavior itself in all the complexity of its controlling relations,
(p. 449)

In About Behaviorism (1974) he writes,
Mental life and the world in which it is lived are inventions. They
have been invented on the analogy of external behavior occur
ring under external contingencies. Thinking is behaving, (p. 115)
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His view of the self inside the skin is:
A self is a repertoire of behavior appropriate to a given set of
contingencies. (1971, p. 189)
Self is simply a device for representing a functionally unified
set of responses. (1953, p. 285)

All these quotations show that, while Skinner believes in the
existence of the mind, he relegates it to the category of feelings
during behavior. Mental states do not initiate behavior but are
caused by it. And, in the same way that the environment controls a
person's behavior, it also controls his thinking and feelings. This
view of the mind suffers from the same problems as some of Skin
ner's other conclusions; there is no evidence to support it. Al
though it is an option, the case for Skinner's view of mental phe
nomena is not based on human laboratory research but on his
theoretical assumptions, and on the generalization of his operant
conditioning principles to make them apply to complex human
activity.
Consider a man who plays eighteen holes of golf every week
hoping to break a score of eighty. Shall we say he is "hoping" to do
this or do the "contingencies of partial reinforcement" explain his
behavior? Feelings of hope and cognition, Skinner says, should be
explained as collaterals of behavior and not initiators of it. But the
question needs to be answered, can Skinner actually show that
thought is conditioned? Are the contingencies of reinforcement
supposed by Skinner supported by persuasive evidence? Has any
attempt been made to identify the primary and secondary rein
forcement histories behind such a man's mental state? Anyone who
has read Science and Human Behavior (1953), Beyond Freedom
and Dignity (1971), and About Behaviorism (1974) can clearly see
that Skinner does not rely on carefully developed data (from, for
example, extinction and secondary reinforcement or shaping and
chaining) for his explanation of mental states. Vet, if his view of
mind is correct, we should be able to find such precise data in our
investigation of human mental behavior. Noam Chomsky in his
"Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior" (1959) said,
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What has been hoped for from the psychologist is some indica
tion how the casual and informal description of everyday be
havior in the popular vocabulary can be explained or clarified in
terms of the notions developed in careful experiment and obser
vation, or perhaps replaced in terms of a better scheme. A mere
terminological revision, in which a term is used with the full
vagueness of the ordinary vocabulary is of no conceivable inter
est. ... It seems that Skinner's claim that all verbal behavior is
acquired and maintained in "strength" through reinforcement is
quite empty, because his notion of reinforcement has no clear
content, functioning only as a cover term for any factor, detect
able or not, related to the acquisition or maintenance of be
havior. (pp. 226-27)

JAMES-LANGE REVISITED

Skinner's theory of human mental
states is very similar to the JamesLange theory of emotions. This theory said that, when a person felt
an emotion, what they were feeling was the arousal of their body's
autonomic nervous system. A classic example of this would be the
feeling of fear one has on meeting a bear in the woods. According to
the James-Lange theory, what is labeled as fear is the person's au
tomatic "fight or flight" response of the sympathetic nervous sys
tem, which increases the heart and breathing rates. This theory was
largely discredited because it can be shown that quadriplegic hu
mans or rats (paralyzed from the neck down and having no feelings
from their autonomic nervous system) still exhibit and report emo
tional feelings. It also seems that the body's physiological arousal is
much too generalized and brief to explain human emotions.
While our emotions are certainly related to our autonomic
arousal, it is by no means clear that our thinking and willing and
other internal mental states are also. When trying to extend his
theory to human thinking, Skinner gives examples of sensory dis
crimination, sensory abstraction, and sensory memories as internal
states that can be related to sensory feeling. But, these do not
exhaust the inner world of the creative, imaginative, reasoning,
thinking mind. No one wishes to claim that thinking is not
influenced by our environment, but is it not rash to suggest that it is
equal to the environment's effect on our bodies?
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RATIONALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

To continue our look at the
limitations of Skinner's view of
the mind, we will now review several major psychological findings
that appear to conflict with it.
The scientists cited would all consider themselves behaviorists
in the sense that they often use behavior as their prime or exclusive
dependent variable in scientific research. But they have not ac
cepted the empirical, blank slate view of man of Skinner's radical
behaviorism, which converts all talk about mind into descriptions of
behavior. The following scientific findings can, therefore, be con
sidered in support of the rationalist tradition in psychology.
Latent Learning and Cognitive Maps—£. C. Tolman
One of the earliest attacks on radical behavioristic theories was
that of E. C. Tolman. After his studies on latent learning Tolman
decided that people and animals could do things in the apparent
absence of discriminative stimuli (Tolman, 1948, 1967). In latent
learning experiments animals are exposed to an environment, but
are not reinforced for any behavior emitted in that environment. In
later testing with reinforcement these animals proved to be superior
to animals that had not previously been exposed to the environ
ment. This experiment showed that learning was taking place all
along in the "mind" of the animal. Even when the rats were placed
on little carts and wheeled through the maze, learning occurred. It
became apparent, then, that reinforcement is necessary for perfor
mance but not for learning.
To explain his rats' abilities to improve by mere exposure to the
test situation, Tolman developed the concept of "cognitive maps."
He felt that the animals were forming a map of the environment in
their heads rather than learning motor responses in the presence of
certain stimuli. The simple explanation of associating a stimulus and
a response will not explain how a rat that is wheeled through a
maze can correctly run through the maze, or how a rat that is
trained to run through the maze can also swim correctly through it.
It is apparent that these animals are learning things in the absence of
discriminative stimuli and their attachments to certain responses.
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FIGURE 6

Days

The results of a latent-learning experiment where animals were re
warded after a period of non-reward. Their performance showed that they
had been learning even without reinforcement (after Tolman and Honzik,

1930).
Tolman also observed vicarious trial-and-error behavior in
animals at choice points in their learning tasks. The animal was
observed to hesitate and visibly compare the alternative stimuli
before making a choice. The active comparison of discriminative
stimuli again seems to indicate cognitive processes at work at these
choice points.
Insight Learning—Wolfgang Kohler

Kohler ran a series of experiments during the years 1913-17 on
the island of Tenerife, off the coast of Africa, which challenged
American behavioristic psychology (Kohler, 1925). In one experi-
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ment an ape had two sticks, a smaller one (X) that needed to be
inserted into a larger one (Y) in order to reach food placed some
distance from the cage. After the ape learned to do this, Kohler took
the smaller stick (X) and replaced it with a stick larger than the first
two (Z). Without any hesitation or fumbling, the ape correctly
placed stick Y into stick Z to get to the food. Skinner's behavioristic
theory would have expected the ape to initially attempt to place Z
into Y. Other experiments involved the need to place one or two
boxes under a hanging banana in order to reach it. While neither of
these experiments was easily solved by the apes, Kohler interpreted
their sudden insight into the solution as indicative that the animal
could survey the situation, think through the possible success of its
behavior, and then test out various solutions.
Language Development—Noam Chomsky
Noam Chomsky (1959) has used research into the develop
ment of human language as an argument against the strict empiricist
stance of Skinner. Research has shown that children the world over
engage in grammatical speech at approximately the same age. This
suggests that the environment is not the major factor in human
language development. The child-rearing practices of parents (even
the presence of mute parents) is not an important factor in language
development. The major defining factor in a child's ability to use
language is the age at which he interacts with his speaking envi
ronment. It appears that children possess a language acquisition
device (LAD), or more accurately a grammar acquisition device,
that comes into use at about age two. Humans can also speak and
understand literally an infinite number of grammatically correct
sentences. There is no need to be exposed to and then be reinforced
for every correct pattern of words that will ever be used.
All of these ideas seem to point rather strongly to the rationalist
and nativist (innate structures) views of language development.
Skinner made his empiricist case for language development in Ver
bal Behavior (1957), but when empirical language acquisition is
seen in operation, as it is when chimps have been taught to use sign
language (object + sign + reinforcement), the tremendous contrast
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between how a child learns language and how a chimp does is
intensified. This difference strengthens the rationalist's case for
human language acquisition.
The Principle of Mass Action—Karl Lashley
Karl Lashley, a student of John Watson, provided evidence that
was disconcerting for the staunch associationistic theorists. Lashley
(1931) trained animals (generally rats) in running a maze or making
a visual discrimination. He would then destroy a part of the animal's
cortex, allow it to recover, and then test it to see in what manner its
performance had been impaired. The outcome of these experiments
was that the amount of cortex destroyed, not its location, deter
mined the deterioration in the animal's behavior. In other words, a
given place in the cortex is not the seat of a particular learned
performance. (On the basis of this evidence Lashley concluded that
the cortex acts as a whole with respect to learning (the principle of
mass action), and that lost brain function can be taken over by other
areas in the brain (the principle of equipotentiality).
Lashley's work relates to behaviorism in an important way;
after his research it was no longer possible to think of the engram, or
the physical basis for learning, in terms of synaptic connections in
the cortex. Pavlov and Watson's work had stressed the idea that
learning was the connection between the incoming sensory stimuli
and the outgoing responses. These stimulus-response connections
had to be some place in the interconnections of neurons mediating
the sensory input and motor output. To find out that the synaptic
connection is not where the learning "is" was disturbing to the
behaviorist to say the least. Lashley's work is not particularly
"rationalistic," but it does say that behavior cannot be thought of as
simply composed of conditioned stimulus-response relationships,
but as much more of a holistic, central process on the part of the
brain. Lashley's work forces the search for the mind, learning, per
sonality, emotions, thought, motivation, and so on, away from a
strictly behavioristic, peripheral, environmental emphasis, toward
the idea that the central processes of the brain are of prime impor
tance in the mental life and activity of the person.
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Observational Learning—Albert Bandura

Albert Bandura (1974) expressed his case against the radical
behaviorism of psychologists in his presidential address at the 1974
meeting of the American Psychological Association.
Originally, conditioning was assumed to occur automatically.
On closer examination it turned out to be cognitively mediated,
(p. 124)
But external consequences, influential as they often are, are not
the sole determinants of human behavior, nor do they operate
automatically, (p. 124)

Bandura feels that the consequences of one's actions serve primarily
as an information function. By observing the effects of their actions
people can discern which behaviors are appropriate in which set
tings. Reinforcement then changes behavior in humans through the
intervening influence of thought. The consequences of our be
haviors can also motivate us. Many of the things we do are con
sciously designed to gain future benefit or to avoid problems. An
ticipated consequences are usually more effective in changing our
behavior than actual consequences, and thus partial reinforcement
is more effective than complete reinforcement.
It is also obvious from Bandura's research that people can learn
by observing and not just by experiencing (Bandura, 1971). The
human mind's capacity to represent modeled behaviors symboli
cally enables man to acquire new behavior through observation
without reinforced enactment. The observations serve later as a
guide for action. Bandura has conducted many experiments on ob
servational learning, particularly with children. In the typical
experiment, the subject watches another person perform some ac
tion. Later the subject's behavior is tested to see how much of the
model s behavior he will demonstrate. Comparison with control
group subjects suggests that the learner learns simply by watching
the model. Bandura's (1965) now famous "Bozo doll" experiment
is illustrative of observational learning. In this experiment children
view a film of an adult hitting and kicking a plastic Bozo doll. These
children learned aggressive responses through the observation of
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the film and demonstrated a similar aggressiveness when given an
opportunity to play with a Bozo doll.
Skinner's theory may explain how similar behavior that a per
son has previously learned is being prompted by the prospect of
reward. But it cannot explain how a new response is acquired ob
servational ly. This learning must be taking place through symbolic
processes before any responses have been performed and rein
forced. Bandura believes something is going on inside the organism
that affects its response to stimuli and influences the value of reinforcers. Furthermore, he looks at the human capacity for thought
and language, human learning without reinforcement, and the gen
eral planning that guides people's lives rather than specific be
havioral objectives as further indications that there is a cognitive
dimension behind human behavior.
Stage Theory of Development—jean Piaget

Jean Piaget, the "giant in the nursery" who died in 1980, con
tributed an enormous legacy to the rationalist position in psychol
ogy. In his stage theory of intellectual development he emphasized
that there is a readiness to learn that is provided by the maturation of
the child. Piaget's stage theory describes how the primitive thought
of infants gradually develops into mature adult thought. This cogni
tive development of the child depends on both biological matura
tion and environmental influences. Piaget has described four major
stages of development, each of which grows out of the stage pre
ceding it: the sensorimotor period (0-2 years), the preoperational
period (2-7 years), the period of concrete operations (7-11 years),
and the period of formal operations (from 11 years onward).
In the sensorimotor period the child's intelligence is manifested
in his actions as he is interacting with his world by sucking, kicking,
hitting, and shaking. Later in this stage the child will develop the
concept of object permanence, which has developed when the child
begins to reach for an object after it has been hidden from view,
having watched it being hidden. At almost two years of age, the child
begins to mentally represent the world through images and symbols.
In the preoperational period the child begins to use words to

66 • B. F. SKINNER'S BEHAVIORISM
represent things and is developing the concepts of time and number
and is learning to put objects in classes. The preoperational mind is
still egocentric, meaning the child has difficulty seeing a situation
from another's perspective.
In the period of concrete operations, children can perform
some new mental operations. Egocentric thought is not as promi
nent, and simple mathematical operations like adding and multi
plying are possible in this period. What is not yet present in the
child's mind is the ability to do abstract thinking. The hallmark of
development during this stage occurs when the child learns the
principle of conservation, the idea that a quantity remains the same
in spite of changes in its appearance. The child can recognize that
changing the shape of clay, for example, or dividing it into parts,
will not change the total amount of clay.
FIGURE 7

The ability to conserve volume involves the ability to recognize that
two equal quantities remain equal even if the volume is redistributed.
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Finally, in the period of formal operations the child moves from
concrete operations to formal, operational thinking. At this level,
children begin to solve problems. Hypotheses are formulated and
tested, and conclusions are based upon the results. The child's
thinking has now become more abstract and logical, like that of an
adult. Thus, the development of the cognitive process is complete.
Again, as in the case of language development, it appears as if
the environment plays an important but indirect role in the intel
lectual growth of the child. Differences in parenting or advanced
training of the child alter only slightly the structured unfolding of the
child's intellectual capabilities. Development rests largely on mat
uration, although it may be hindered by an unfavorable environ
ment or advanced by a favorable one. Thus, Piaget's theory is a
weighty, centralist theory and needs to be dealt with by the
peripheral theory of Skinner.
SUMMARY

In summary, it can be said that Skinner's view of the
mind has not been supported by evidence from the
operant conditioning laboratory and runs counter to much psycho
logical data. Skinner sees all aspects of mental life as a product of
the environment and physiological states of the body. He has not,
however produced experimental evidence of primary and secon
dary reinforcement that would support a conditioning theory of
mental phenomena. Skinner's view of the mind also fails to account
adequately for a wide range of impressive psychological data that
does not support a strictly empirical view of the mind. The nativist
data of Chomsky and Piaget, and the cognitive implications of the
research of Bandura, Tolman, and Kohler seem to suggest that while
Skinner's behaviorism may explain simple, animal or human be
havior, it fails to explain the complexities of human mental life. As
Daniel Robinson (1979) put it:
It is to the credit of Skinner and of those who have adopted his
program that we now possess an immense catalogue of experi
mental findings describing the subtle and durable effects of
"reinforcement contingencies". This part of the overall contribu
tion is as impressive as it is unimpeachable, but as Skinner him-
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self has moved beyond the data, as he has attempted to include
under the umbrella of the law of effect the entire range of human
activities, the Skinnerian system has repeatedly foundered and
failed, (p. 138)

THE QUESTION
OF FREEDOM

With the publication of Beyond Freedom and Dignity
(1971), Skinner's view of
human determinism exploded
upon the public with its denial
of human freedom and sug
gestions for human engineering. Although determinism has a long
history, the prestige of today's science and the popularity of psy
chology combined with Skinner's literary forcefulness are present
ing a strong challenge to the traditional view of human freedom and
responsibility. That challenge is the focus of this chapter.
Since some of the greatest minds in history have not resolved
the issue of freedom and determinism to everyone's satisfaction,
there is no reason to expect that we could do so in a few pages.
Consequently we will limit ourselves to an evaluation of Skinner s
case for determinism in the light of the data of operant conditioning.
We will also look briefly at some of the practical philosophical
problems for a deterministic view of human nature.
WHAT DOES SKINNER BELIEVE Skinner's views of human freeABOUT FREEDOM?
dom are fairly common knowl-
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edge because of Walden Two (1948) and Beyond Freedom and
Dignity (1971). To Skinner the belief in a human agent who is the
initiator of his own behaviors is an illusion. He believes that the
controlling factor of all human behavior is the environment, or more
specifically, the contingencies of reinforcement in that person's past
and present environment. Not only outward behavior, but even
inner feelings, motivations, reasonings, and rational choices are
conditioned products of the environment. In Beyond Freedom and
Dignity (1971) Skinner wrote:
What is being abolished is autonomous man—the inner man, the
homunculus, the processing demon, the man defended by the
literatures of freedom and dignity.
His abolition has long been overdue. Autonomous man is a
device used to explain what we cannot explain in any other way.
He has been constructed from our ignorance, and as our under
standing increases, the very stuff of which he is composed van
ishes. Science does not dehumanize man, it dehomunculizes
him. and it must do so if it is to prevent the abolition of the
human species. To man qua man we readily say good riddance.
Only by dispossessing him can we turn to the real causes of
human behavior. Only then can we turn from the inferred to the
observed, from the miraculous to the natural, from the inaccessi
ble to the manipulable. (p. 191)

The determinism of Skinner leaves one with a different kind of
mechanistic man than )ohn Watson's determinism does. Watson's
emphasis was on reflex conditioning; it produced a picture of man
the robot pacing through the activities of the day with the same
reflex action as that of a knee jerk. Skinner's view of emitted be
havior, however, leaves a person feeling free and apparently
choosing much of the behavior he will engage in. But in actuality he
is just as determined as the reflex man of Watson.
DETERMINISM OR INFLUENCE?

It is difficult to imagine any
experiment that could be de
signed to prove the case for determinism (or free will). Would it
prove determinism to observe that 100% of the people at a certain
beach wear bathing suits? That represents a perfect correlation

THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM • 71
between an environment and a behavior, but does it mean that
those individuals have been determined to wear bathing suits as
opposed to having chosen to do so? Does it prove determinism to
demonstrate that when a person's arm is twisted he can be made
to drink water? Certainly, in my own case, swimming and pain are
two examples of what I would describe as strongly compelling
stimuli in determining my behavior. But could I ever demonstrate
determinism by the mere description of environment and be
havior?
It might also be asked whether demonstrating that human be
havior can be conditioned leads automatically to the conclusion
that human behavior is so conditioned in real life? Does demon
strating that a person has no apparent control over some extreme
stimulus contingencies, mean that in other areas of his life he is also
determined? I raise these questions to suggest that Skinner has been
less than cautious in using the results of human and animal condi
tioning experiments to make pronouncements about human deter
minism. A careful analysis of the data suggests that influence, not
determinism, is a more convincing description of what Skinner has
demonstrated. Human freedom does not mean that a person is not
influenced by the environment, or that in certain situations he might

not be determined by the environment. It simply means that the
persons are agents, capable of making choices about what they do.
SECONDARY REINFORCEMENT
AND COMPLEX BEHAVIOR

A major feature of Skinner's
theorizing is the application of
his theory of operant condi
tioning, which was developed by reasoning from relatively simple
animal behavior to extraordinarily complex human actions. He
bridges this huge gap by relying heavily upon the concepts of
shaping, chaining, and secondary reinforcers we discussed in
chapter 3. A complex behavior is supposedly made up of numerous
smaller behaviors, and the whole complex function is maintained
by a steady supply of secondary reinforcers. Although human be
havior is undoubtedly too complex to spot the multitudes of minute
conditioning events that shape complex behaviors, if Skinner"s view
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is accurate, some of the more obvious primary and secondary rein
forcement contingencies for any behavior ought to be visible.
To demonstrate, let me ask the question, According to operant
conditioning theory, why do students attend my classes? Since very
little human behavior is in the control of primary reinforcers like
food or water, we must look for frequent secondary reinforcers that
are maintained by occasional primary reinforcement. My students,
then, are not attending class because I distribute candy after every
class; there are easier ways to obtain food. They are attending class
for what Skinner would consider secondary reinforcement, that is,
grades, praise, entertainment, and knowledge.
From what is known of secondary reinforcement in the
laboratory, there should be a conditioning history for the develop
ment of these reinforcers. Perhaps in my students' earliest school
years good grades were rewarded with praise or ice cream, and bad
grades resulted in punishment. From animal studies it is clear that
secondary reinforcers (e.g., praise, grades) have to be repeatedly
paired with other conditioned reinforcers (e.g., money, attention) or
with primary reinforcers (e.g., food, water) in order to continue their
effectiveness and prevent the extinction of learned behaviors. But
my students' class attendance (or any behavior for that matter) does
not reveal a maintenance of secondary reinforcers by primary rein
forcement. In fact, human secondary reinforcers are extraordinarily
strong and resistent to extinction even though possible related pri
mary reinforcers are far removed in time. Human secondary rein
forcers, such as conversation, praise, achievement, and others
appear to be better explained by Bandura's cognitive factors or
Maslow's hierarchy of needs.
Other examples from daily human behavior pose similar
difficulties for the determinist who sees behavior as totally con
trolled by reinforcement. How does operant conditioning theory
explain the words a poet chooses when he writes a poem? Can the
properties of the present and past environments that are determining
the choice of his next word be identified? Furthermore, any stimulus
properties found must be shown to be conditioned and uncon
ditioned reinforcers with the same characteristics as those that the
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theory of operant conditioning would predict. But such contingen
cies of reinforcement are not apparent in daily human behavior.
"REBEL" BEHAVIOR

When observing human behavior or re
flecting on our own, it becomes quite clear
that much of the time we resist reinforcement or brave certain
punishment in order to engage in certain behaviors. My students
have to drag themselves out of bed, face inclement weather, endure
uncomfortable desks, and fight off sleep in order to attend my
classes. A champion athlete will rise before the sun, endure hours of
grueling exercises, and expend much physical and psychological
energy on his sport. But what reinforcement causes this behavior? A
few tennis players work for cash, Olympic athletes expect gold
medals, but most athletes do not win money or gold medals.
Weekend joggers and eight-year-old little league baseball players
are not paid either.
To say that there is a tremendous physical and psychological
exhileration in the expenditure of energy and the excitement of
competition ignores the hours of pain and years of grueling practice
that must occur before these brief exhilarating moments. In fact, it
does not feel exhilarating to get out of bed in the morning. If operant
conditioning were accurate in describing human behavior, the
world would come to a grinding halt since everyone in it would
follow the path of least resistance by remaining in bed for long
hours, eating endless meals, and relaxing comfortably all day! Yet
much of our behavior apparently rebels against this reinforcing
environment. We must rise above our environment to work and
play, and this way we build the massive legacy of human achieve
ment throughout the world.
In what other way can the actions of some of the great indi
viduals of history, who have not conformed to the expectations and
reinforcement contingencies of their day be explained? Their his
tories reveal refusals to settle for the easy life, or the safe life, or the
accepted, traditional modes of behavior. In what other way can we
explain the creative behavior of individuals? Creative behavior
involves rebelling against the traditional, accepted, praised, and
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FIGURE 8

Many human behaviors result in more pain than pleasure.
This fact is not in line with the operant conditioning theory.

rewarded ways of thinking and doing things. The creative artist,
inventor, or scientist may find acceptance later in life or long after
he is dead, but this is invariably preceded by years of apparently
unreinforced behavior. In addition, what classroom teacher or
prison warden has not noticed the "rebel" who does not respond to
the rewards and punishment set up for him in a token economy?
Skinner explains all of these examples of rebel behavior by
pointing out that it is obvious that for some people the tradiitonal
reinforcements or punishments are not reinforcing or punishing. To
stay in bed may be reinforcing to you, but not for someone else. To
lose your job and be sent to prison may be punishment for you, but
not to a Russian dissident. There are other nontraditional stimuli that
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must be reinforcing their behaviors. This is called the hiddenparameters argument because Skinner is saying that there must be
reinforcers "hidden" out there in the environment, because he
knows his theory is correct! This is a nice try but it fails both logi
cally and scientifically. To begin with, Skinner simply tries to ex
plain away any conceivable evidence against his theory. All that he
has to do is to say that there is a reinforcer out there someplace for
every complicated human behavior. We just don't know where it is!
From this position, Skinner does not produce "evidence" for his
theory of determinism. He simply claims the reinforcement is out
there somewhere because otherwise humans would not be engag
ing in behaviors that they do. The question is, has careful observa
tion and experimentation revealed such reinforcement systems? The
answer is no, this hypothesized "hidden reinforcer" is a product of
his theory, not of his experimental evidence.
By the hidden-parameters argument, Skinner is again assuming
the very thing that is in question, namely, whether or not human
behavior is controlled by the environment. Our objection is that it
seems as if much human behavior either goes against the obvious
contingencies of reinforcement or braves certain punishment. Skin
ner's replies that it is clear that since such reinforcements are not
reinforcing and such punishments are not punishing, there must be
other nontraditional reinforcers. Skinner argues that a person would
not be engaging in these behaviors unless they were being rein
forced by the environment. But the argument is circular. Is all
human behavior controlled by reinforcements from the environ
ment? To argue by using hidden parameters instead of evidence
does not answer the question. And thus, the fact remains that much
of human behavior stands in apparently clear contradiction of Skin
ner's view of determinism in man.
THE LOSS OF TRUTH

Although the lack of evidence for Skin
ner's view is a serious weakness, that is
not the only problem. If one accepts Skinner's determinism, certain
of its ramifications must also be accepted. Skinner's behaviorism
tells us that a person's past and present environment is responsible
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for all of his behavior. This means that if Skinner encounters a
devout Christian or a devout atheist, he would say that their envi
ronments had led them to these different ideas and behavior pat
terns. If a fierson identifies himself as a Republican as opposed to a
Democrat, according to Skinner it is because he has a complex
determining background that includes the political preferences of
his parents, his yearly income, and his religious preference.
In these examples it is not bec ause of a search for truth that a
person ends up with a religious or political preference, but because
of environment. One cannot really know what is true in any area of
know/edge. For example, the reader of this book cannot know
whether my evaluation of Skinner's behaviorism is true or not, since
it is merely the product of my particular educational and religious
background.
Although this inability to discover truth is not troublesome to
Skinner, it must at least be pointed out that it applies to his own
teachings also. If determinism is true, then every idea that comes
from Skinner's mind is a product of his particular environment. If he
had experienced a completely different past history, he could now
be teaching in defense of human freedom and not against it! There
fore, why should anyone believe what Skinner says about deter
minism? His has not been an unbiased, scientific search for truth,
but behaviors and ideas conditioned by the environment! It is not
that truth does not exist or that it is not present in the teachings of
people. The problem is that we could never know whether we had
found truth.
THE LOSS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Another difficulty with Skin
ner's behaviorism is that its
view of responsibility seems unrealistic and unrelated to daily life.
The title of Skinner's book. Beyond Freedom and Dignity, means
that he believes that human freedom does not exist and con
sequently neither does human dignity as a product of the credit we
give individuals for good and distinguished behavior. If Skinner is
right, then we cannot hold criminals responsible for their bad be
havior. for they have only been conditioned by their environments.
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It would be interesting to know what might go on in the mind of
Skinner if ever he would be robbed. Like any of us he would proba
bly feel that the criminal should not be robbing him. If the criminal
pointed a gun at him, he might say, "Please, don't shoot me!" Such
a plea would imply that the criminal had freedom, since Skinner
would be holding him responsible for the robbery and asking not to
be shot, as if the criminal had a choice in the matter. This example
would not be convincing to Skinner because he would say that our
thoughts about other's freedoms are simply wrong, his own in
cluded. But the point is that all of us (including Skinner) would find
it so objectionable to no longer hold anyone responsible for his own
behavior that we simply would refuse to live that way. It is difficult
to imagine a world in which we would not hold others responsible if
they refused to give us our pay check, show up for work on time,
slop killing people, and other such things. It is not that the environ
ment doesn't influence what a person does; we would simply find it
impossible to shift the entire responsibility for what every person
does to the environment.
Skinner, however, does try to be consistent with his deter
ministic beliefs. In an article entitled, "A Case History in the Sci
entific Method." Skinner (1961) describes some of his past experi
ments as a way of showing how he was conditioned to behave by
his environment and the animal subjects he used. He also used to
chart his cumulative professional behavior in his office just as he did
with his animals. Many times in his writings he uses words that refer
to himself as having been conditioned by his past. In his autobiog
raphy he says that his wife "reinforced" him appropriately when he
taught the psychology of literature (Skinner, 1967). When asked
why he bothers to write a book if all behavior is determined any
way, he says that to answer that, you have to look into the rein
forcement history of a behaviorist!
But in spite of his protests Skinner often continues to use the
language of freedom and dignity, almost as if real communication
about human beings cannot be carried on without it. In Beyond
Freedom and Dignity (1971) he seems forced to use language in
which he attributes part of the person's behavior to his own initiative:
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When an individual engages in intentional design of a cultural
practice. ... (p. 210)
He is controlled by his environment, but we must remember that
it is an environment largely of his own making, (p. 215)
To refuse to control. ... (p. 5)

Is it not also inconsistent with belief in determinism for Skinner to
urge his listening and reading audience to rise up and change the
world with behavioral technology? His last sentence in Beyond
Freedom and Dignity (1971) challenges us, "We have not yet seen
what man can make of man" (p. 206). This is paradoxical; how can
Skinner put man into the determined, natural order and then ask
him to control that order? How can a totally determined organism
transcend his environmental determinism to take charge of an
environment that totally determines him? Yet Skinner repeatedly
suggests that human beings can and should exploit his scientific
knowledge of mechanized man in order to raise themselves to new
heights of kindness, intelligence, and happiness.
Albert Bandura (1974) has given the same criticism of Skinner's
determinism.
To contend, as environmental determinists often do, that people
are controlled by external forces and then to advocate that they
redesign their society by applying behavioral technology under
mines the basic premise of the argument. If humans were in fact
incapable of influencing their own actions, they would describe
and predict environmental events but hardly exercise any inten
tional control over them. (p. 136)

The criticism that Skinner fails to live as he is determined may
seem superficial. In fact, when pressed for why he lives with a
certain amount of unconscious recognition of his own and other's
freedom, Skinner merely has to say, "I am determined to do so."
And yet, maybe our behaviors speak more loudly than our words
about our beliefs. If a man tells me he does not believe that it is
possible to gather any truth from sensory experience, and I later
observe him picking a fly out of his hamburger, what am I to con
clude? Is he just going through the motions of plucking an imaginary
fly out of his imaginary hamburger so that he will not have to
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imagine eating it? Or do his actions show that no matter what he
says he really does trust in what his senses tell him? On the level of
daily life, Skinner, too, finds it difficult to live the "truth" he teaches.
It seems reasonable to gauge what people really think as much by
their behavior as by their theoretical pronouncements!
In summary, readers of Skinner's works ought to give careful
consideration to what his work on operant conditioning has and has
not demonstrated. Credit needs to be given to Skinner for develop
ing an enormous amount of data that has revealed the important
role of the environment on human behavior. When the nature ver
sus nurture question is raised, one can be confident that a strong
influence of the environment has been demonstrated. But what has
been both demonstrated in the laboratory and observed in the world
at large is influence, not determinism. Those who believe in the
freedom and dignity of man need not lose confidence because of
B. F. Skinner's behaviorism.
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THE QUESTION
OF VRLUE AND CONTROL

Undoubtedly, one of the
major sources of the resis
tance to Skinner's behaviorism is the public's fear
that it might work! A popular * book,
(and
movie) A
Clockwork Orange (1962), helped heighten the public's fear of the
power of science. Alex, whose name means "without law," is the
lead character in A Clockwork Orange. He is a young gang leader
who commits one horrible crime after another. Living in a world
that contains millions of people like Alex makes normal citizens
desperate to accept any psychological solution offered. But the
psychoengineering offered in the book seems so repugnant and
degrading to those who believe in human freedom and dignity that
one is left wondering if it is wrong to apply it, even to a person like
Alex.
In great contrast to A Clockwork Orange, Skinner's Walden
Two (1948) tells of a very pleasant community where the measures
of control are not visible and where everyone is healthy and happy.
Skinner's positive description makes everyone (except philosophers
like the book's Professor Castle) desire to move in.
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Skinner should be credited for thinking beyond the laboratory
to the problems facing the real world. Too often scientists are
wrapped up in trivial research that produces dozens of scholarly
publications (and perhaps tenure!) but does not relate to the larger
world. Not that all science has to be applied, but, without applica
tion, science can become a monumental exercise in trivia. In con
trast to such irrelevant research, Skinner (1970) dreams of a better
world:
It is hard to imagine a world in which people live together with
out quarrelling, maintain themselves by producing the food,
shelter, and clothing they need, enjoy themselves and contribute
to the enjoyment of others in art, music, literature, and games,
consume only a reasonable part of the resources of the world and
add as little as possible to its pollution, bear no more children
than can be raised decently, continue to explore the world
around them and discover better ways of dealing with it, and
come to know themselves accurately and, therefore, manage
themselves effectively, (p. 204)

In order to accomplish all of this, Skinner believes that the prin
ciples of operant conditioning need to be applied on a larger
scale.
Unfortunately (according to Skinner) the literatures of freedom
and dignity and the public's fears of loss of freedom and unscrupu
lous control are blocking the successful application of this kind of
technology. This is one reason why Skinner attacks the writings of
C. S. Lewis. Skinner believes he must displace the "unscientific"
views of man with his "scientific" one and thus calm the fears of
control. He writes (1971):
It (technology of behavior) will not solve our problems, however,
until it replaces traditional prescientific views, and these are
strongly entrenched, (p. 25)

In this chapter, we will look at both the possibility of exercising the
type of control Skinner advocates and the value questions inherent
in this type of behavioral control. We will begin with an examina
tion of the possibility of behavioral control.
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
BEHAVIORAL TECHNOLOGY

In spite of all of the laboratory
success in applying operant con
ditioning methods to animals,
serious questions remain about the feasibility of effectively applying
these techniques to a variety of complex human functions, let alone
to society at large. The main attempts that have been made are in
the area of behavior therapy, and even there, some major limita
tions have become apparent.
Behavioral therapists' greatest successes have tended to come
with individuals suffering from rather specific symptoms of a cir
cumscribed nature. A variety of phobias, for example, have been
shown to respond well to behavior therapy (Bandura, Blanchard,
and Ritter, 1969; Wolpe, 1963, 1969). Behavioral techniques have
also proven effective in weight loss programs (Penick, Filion, Fox
and Stunkard, 1971; Stuart, 1971) and in curtailing smoking be
havior (McFall, 1970; Nolan, 1968). Some progress has also been
demonstrated in the treatment of withdrawn and even autistic chil
dren (Louvass, 1967; Schopler, Brehm, Kinsbourne, and Reichler,
1971), unmotivated delinquents (Bandura, 1969; Bednar, Zelhart,
Greathouse, and Weinberg, 1970), and chronic schizophrenics
(Atthowe & Krasner, 1968; Ayllon and Azrin, 1965). As we move
from the more circumscribed symptoms to disturbances of the total
personality, however, the effectiveness of behavioral methods to
radically alter personality is increasingly called into question.
While behavior therapy has been used to reduce odd behaviors
and promote greater cooperation on psychiatric wards, it has not
been effective in resolving the confused thinking of psychotics or
leading them back to emotional health or maturity. In this regard,
behavior therapy for emotional problems might be compared to
taking aspirin for a fever. It works, and lesser problems may be
resolved, but it may not touch the source of the fever.
Another limitation of behavioral approaches is in getting
people to cooperate. In hospital token economies, about 20% of
chronic schizophrenics refuse to take part in the token economy
and thus fail to emit behaviors that can be reinforced; in prisons,
token economies are often resisted by means of organized strikes or
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sit-ins (Geiser, 1976). It seems that if people know they are being
controlled, they resist it. The inherent desire and ability to exercise
one's freedom could explain this failure.
Another consistent weakness of token economies is their failure
to transfer from the treatment program to the normal living envi
ronment. Since the outside environment has a different reinforce
ment system, the behaviors learned in therapy may not continue in
other situations. Consider a prisoner, for example, who has learned
to avoid fights in a prison through use of a token economy program.
When he is released he may learn that fighting outside the prison
produces its own reinforcement. Consequently, unless the larger
environment can be controlled, token economies will be of limited
value. Such limitations suggest that applying behavioristic technol
ogy to the whole of society is impractical no matter how well devel
oped the techniques become. Finley Carpenter (1974) in his book
The Skinner Primer remarks:
The main crack in the tight Skinnerian system occurs when Skin
ner begins to extend his principles to behavior beyond the
laboratory, (p. 95)

Operant conditioning can control the behavior of simple or
ganisms because it is carried out in a controlled environment with
knowledge of the reinforcement history of the organism, a restricted
range of behavior for the organism, and the ability to constantly
monitor the organism's behavior and deliver immediate reinforce
ment. Imagine the difficulty in even the smallest of societies, how
ever, in controlling the minds and behaviors of all of its citizens!
How does one arrange reinforcers in order to control the minds of
everybody if the controller cannot observe what each person is
thinking or feeling at a given moment? We can observe behavior,
but one s behavior does not always relate to the thoughts and emo
tions that have to be shaped and controlled. Even if it were possible
to control such inner states, it would be necessary to have a
controller for every person. And what controller would be prepared
to monitor every behavior and deliver immediate reinforcement?
Walden Two seems to run very smoothly with no apparent
controllers only because there are few major behaviors being con-
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trolled. Everyone in Walden Two worked, for example, because he
received labor credits. But what controlled the hundreds of daily
inner behaviors of anger, laziness, jealousy, rebellion, or creativity?
These are apparently assumed by Skinner to be smoothly under the
control of a society whose members have had all of these inner
states conditioned by the proper child development conditioning
procedures. But is this possible? Skinner assumes that with a prop
erly controlled upbringing, the whole society would just "naturally"
begin to function as a behaviorist would desire, with each person
doing and saying the right thing at the right time to reinforce
everyone's behavior! There is nothing that has been done in the rat
laboratory, the token economy, or communal living situations to
suggest that this type of behavioral engineering could ever function
in this way.
Our previous discussion about the impossibility of starting or
running a Walden-Two society assumes that the behavioristic model
of conditioned man may be true. If it is not, and if humans have
significant degrees of freedom and self motivation, there is no way
Walden Two can work! An operantly-conditioned childhood will not
succeed unless the infant is born with a blank slate and does not
possess a potential for free choice. One also wonders why Skinner
has never attempted to establish his own Walden Two. I do not sense
that what is needed is a younger man to pioneer the community, or a
few more years to work out the "bugs" in the theory, or an end to the
public resistance to the idea of control. A careful analysisof Skinner's
view of the person suggests that what is needed is a theory of
personality that more accurately fits human nature and the human
condition. This is not to say that behaviorism will not find significant
success in some types of counseling or limited aspects of social
engineering. But Walden Two, like most Utopias, will never exist
except between the covers of a book and in dreams.
VALUE AND ETHICS

Any discussion about the application of a
scientific technology like behaviorism in

evitably leads to a discussion about value judgments. Even though
we have questioned the feasibility of widespread social engineer-
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ing, it is interesting to look at some of the problems raised if such
control were possible. With a technology in hand, one has to decide
what goals it should have and what, if any, boundaries are placed
on its use.
Consider the problem facing any counselor. How is he to de
cide the optimum in human personality or behavior toward which
he should guide his clients? A behavior modification expert has to
decide whether homosexuality is acceptable or not, and whether or
not introverted behavior is acceptable. Today's psychologists gen
erally say that the goal is whatever the client chooses, and that
whatever behavior harms the client or others is unacceptable. But
these generalizations do not answer the value question. What tells
you that the client should decide the goal of therapy, or by what
value structure do you decide what is harmful to the client or
others? Most counselors make value choices every day without
thinking about the source of those values.
The problem of picking values to guide a technology is greatly
magnified when we consider the possibility of a behavioral en
gineer redesigning society. How would the designers of Walden
Two choose the kinds of human personalities to develop even if
they could exercise such complete control? What thoughts and ac
tions and professions are to be conditioned into the community?
And according to what value system did Skinner decide that in
Walden Two fashion consciousness was not desirable in women or
that early marriage was good. How were any of the thousands of
decisions that would shape the future Utopia made?
A naturalistic philosophy like Skinner's behaviorism can only
arbitrarily decide on a value structure for guidance; it can never
insist that any other set of values based on different arbitrary deci
sions is wrong. This fact shows the relativism in the moral behavior
of a secular culture and the paralysis of the "guidance" voice of
science. In the famous Rogers-Skinner debate (Rogers and Skinner,
1956) Rogers remarked about the values dilemma of the behavioral
engineer, "The value or purpose that gives meaning to a particular
scientific endeavor must always lie outside of the endeavor" (p. 16)In other words, even if behavioral technology could produce the
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massive changes it claims, it could never rightfully say anything
about whether the technology should be used or to what ends it
should be used.
In order to understand Skinner's answer concerning his source
of value in a deterministic system, you must realize that he does not
intend to rise out of determinism to "choose" his values. The values
he or anyone else may choose are already determined by environ
ment. In a sense Skinner tells his critics not to worry about the
choice of values because their environment has already chosen for
them.
In Skinner's view, values are automatically produced in the
evolving organism. Whatever the organism prefers or finds rein
forcing is to be considered valuable because these things have
obviously allowed the organism to survive. Since I exist today as
opposed to being extinct, my preferences should be considered
valid value judgments. For Skinner, the one ultimate value is the
survival of the human culture. He writes (1969), "Whether we like it
or not, survival is the value by which we shall be judged. The
culture which takes its survival into account is most likely to sur
vive" (p. 46).
Looking at Skinner's view that value is that which is reinforcing
and aids the survival of man, we can conclude that he believes that
whatever is, is good and ought to exist. If a single behavior or an
entire culture exists, then it must contain a reinforcing value system
and is therefore good. If it is, it is reinforcing; it must be good.
In saying that what is, is good, Skinner seems to be arguing that
we need not be completely agnostic about what is ethical and
valuable. All that we have to do is to look at our present set of values
and observe what appears to be working and what is not. After all, if
our culture has survived thus far, it must have much good in its
present consensus of value. If it contains too many "bad" behaviors,
it will soon die as a culture. But, if someone searches for value by
looking at his culture's values to decide what has worked and what
has not, he is already using a hidden value system in order to obtain
a value system. By what values will I measure what has "worked"?
To assert that anything that exists has value because it has
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survived means that every existent behavior and every culture is of
value; this is highly debatable. Can we look at our own lives or our
own culture and make that statement? Philosopher Francis Schaeffer
comments appropriately on Skinner's basis for value and ethics in
his booklet Back to Freedom and Dignity (1972):
Skinner does not seem to notice that he has gotten himself into a
logical box. Ultimately, what he is saying reduces to whatever is
is right, and, if whatever is is right, then there is no value over
against which one can judge anything as good or bad. If it is, it is
good. And if everything that is is good, then any concept of bad is
either illogical or trivial. Neither a man like Skinner nor a man
like George Wald has any reason why the survival of the race is
desirable.
Within the Skinnerian system there are no ethical controls.
There is no boundary limit to what can be done by the elite in
whose hands control resides, (p. 40)

In considering the practical problem of using Skinner's system
of value to guide a future Walden Two, it can be seen that essen
tially he has no value system to offer. He would have to make
decisions as to the goals and values of the culture by trying to
discern what would promote the survival of the culture. In the back
of his mind, he must already have a hidden set of values to tell him
what he means by survival (the survival of physical structures? per
sonality traits? religious ideals?). He must also develop a set of
values to weigh the survival of his culture against the survival of
other existing, competing cultures, the good of one member of his
community rather than another, and the good of the individual
versus the good of the community. It hardly seems conceivable that
Skinner s basis for value could guide either long range planning or
the day to day decisions of Walden Two.
The Question of Control
If there is doubt about the ability of a science to establish
guidelines for the use of its technologies, questions and fears are
immediately raised about unscrupulous or despotic control meas
ures. But since behavioral technology does not utilize punishment
and says that all mental states can be conditioned, Skinner says that
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fears of 1984 are unfounded. His behavioral technology should
produce a world in which everyone would be controlled to feel
free, be happy, act kindly, and do all the right things. It would be a
control that would never be felt or resisted.
Even though this kind of control would theoretically not "feel
bad," it seems to be feared more than the punishing, repressive kind
because it involves mind control. At least the slave knows he is a
slave and, therefore, has some dignity and freedom in spite of his
chains. But in Skinner's world even that freedom would be lost; we
would be smiling, happy robots.
In C. S. Lewis' The Silver Chair (1953), a good prince, who is a
prisoner of the wicked queen, has had his mind altered so that he
"willingly" serves her for twenty-three hours a day. But for one hour
each day he awakes from his control as from a bad dream and has to
be restrained. During his hour of mental freedom he anguishes over
what she has done to him. Part of his horror is the realization that at
the end of the hour he will again lose the awareness of who he
really is and begin again to serve the wicked queen. Not even an
hour of freedom would exist in Skinner's system. We fear his kind of
control because supposedly we would not know enough to feel
unhappy or resent being controlled.
Skinner's answer to all of these fears is a simple one. There is
no freedom to lose. You are already being controlled now by your
environment! Government, education, parents, and peer groups
shape and control your behavior (usually in an unenjoyable, aversive fashion). Do not worry about losing what you do not possess.
But this is not a very comforting answer to those who do be
lieve in freedom and the very real possibility of losing that freedom
in a Skinnerian world. When they imagine Skinner's world in oper
ation, they generally see a small group of controllers shaping the
lives of the masses. They believe that in order to set up a tightly
controlled, deterministic system you have to have your planners
and controllers free of the system, to stand outside in order to
control its functioning. The planners and controllers then become
an elite group that holds the destiny of the masses in their hands. It is
this kind of picture that is questioned.
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What qualifies these individuals to be controllers? What makes
them so good or so knowledgeable that they can successfully do this
job? Have they lived such model lives that they can be trusted with
such power? Is their knowledge so great that they can shape the
destiny of the human race? Do they have all the knowledge of
human function and needs as well as the grace to use this knowl
edge compassionately? Do they have knowledge of all the con
tingencies of reinforcement affecting a human being and of all
possible shaping programs that can work in an entire society? Do
our government leaders, or leading scientists, or peers live such
model lives and possess such knowledge that we can turn this kind
of power over to them? Those who believe in freedom say no.
Skinner's answer to this fear is again very simple and based on
his assumption of determinism in man. He says that there would be
no elite group of controllers in a future Walden Two. Everyone
controls everyone else's behavior right now. The same controllers
and controlling situations that exist now would also exist in Walden
Two. Government leaders may control the populace, but they
would be controlled by voting and other relevant behaviors of the
populace. The teacher may control the class, but she is controlled
by her students' behaviors. A scientist may be in charge in a
laboratory, but his behavior is controlled by the particles or the
animals he studies. There is a popular magazine cartoon of two rats
in a Skinner Box. Looking up at the researcher, one rat is saying to
the other, "Boy, have I got this guy conditioned! Every time I press
the bar down, he drops in a piece of food!" To Skinner, this cartoon
is true. The scientist may be conditioning the rat, but the rat is
likewise conditioning the scientist.
Skinner says we should not fear unscrupulous control in a
Walden Two because the controllers would be countercontrolled
by the populace. In Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) Skinner
emphasizes this countercontrol. "He is indeed controlled by his
environment, but we must remember that it is an environment
largely of his own making" (p. 205). This is a way of saying that we
are controllers, too, because we are a part of the environment.
It is a legitimate question, though, as to whether everyone has
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FIGURE 9

"Boy, have I got this guy conditioned! Every time I press the bar down,
he drops in a piece of food." Used by permission of Jester of Columbia
University.

the same opportunity to countercontrol. It does not seem that the
"followers" could ever be given the necessary tools and the techni
cal know-how to control the "leaders". To Skinner this countercontrol assumes the position of a "law of nature" that operates
perfectly without our intervention. But, I can imagine that my
screams of pain could keep a bully from breaking my arm, but not
keep him from bending the arm just so far. Of what consolation is
my countercontrolling scream? It is hard to imagine that his muscles
and my screams are equivalent control stimuli.
For many reasons then, if it were possible to control a society,
we should be concerned about the application of behavioral
technology. If freedom really exists, Skinner's technology would
have no guarantees of ethical restraint and guidance. An elite group
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would have to be set up outside of the controlled system. Con
trollers would share the very faults they wish to cure us of. Countercontrol would be a myth. Skinner, who does not believe in freedom,
would not have to worry about any of these objections. For this
reason, his writings have not been reassuring to the reading public.
Given his assumptions, he does not have to come up with ethical
plans or built-in restraints against unscrupulous controllers. His
ideas are shielded by a deterministic box of his own construction.
It should be said that the mere existence of a technology does
not justify its application. Even if someone could apply Skinner's
technology to society, the tremendous doubts about the determinis
tic model that underlies behavioral engineering indicate that it
would be applied without adequate safeguards and without the
needed countercontrol. There is also a danger that human freedom
could be retarded by massive doses of extrinsic reinforcement.
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that intensive extrinsic rein
forcement tends to turn play into work, that is, what you used to do
because of intrinsic motivation (play), you now will only do for
extrinsic reinforcement (work). Perhaps the direction that psychol
ogy should pursue is to develop the internal motivation of individu
als and teach them how to use extrinsic reinforcers, as opposed to a
massive attempt to control the whole of society with a Walden Two
system.

SKINNER'S ANSWERS
TO KlS CRITICS

The last four chapters have
discussed the serious limita
tions of Skinner's under- CS standing of human nature.
Skinner is not oblivious to O these criticisms; he responds
by saying that a fuller understanding of his laboratory findings will
answer the doubts of his more philosophically minded critics.
Skinner's critics (Wheeler, 1973) contend, however, that the issues
are not the kind that can be resolved by pointing to scientific data;
they insist that Skinner uses assumptions for facts and then makes
grandiose pronouncements about the nature of man from selective
data.
A look at Skinner's interactions with his critics suggests that
very little real communication is going on between them. Reading
the Rogers and Skinner (1956) debate, for example, makes it clear
that while each presents his arguments well, they fail to win be
cause they are speaking from such different underlying assump
tions. Although Skinner's answers are reasonable within his radical
behavioristic view of things, they really do not resolve the prob
lems Rogers raises from his phenomenological perspective. The
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best way to acquaint the reader with the problems of the dialogue
however, is to let Skinner speak for himself. Skinner's responses to
the following objections should help clarify his stand and demon
strate some of the problems of communication between Skinner
and his critics.
SKINNER SAYS THAT HUMANS

Skinner denies that his be-

ARE MECHANIZED ROBOTS

haviorism describes human
beings as automatons. Al

though this might accurately describe the determinism of the
classical conditioning theory of Watson in which stimuli elicit re
sponses in a reflex fashion, Skinner does not view his theory this
way. He writes:
But stimuli do not elicit operant responses; they simply modify
the probability that responses will be emitted. They do so be
cause of the contingencies of reinforcement in which they have
played a part, and they may act in combination with other con
ditions, possibly but not necessarily to the point at which a re
sponse occurs. This is a far different role from that of the eliciting
stimulus in a reflex, (p. 245)
In other words, Skinner says we should not confuse his theory with a
theory that builds all human behavior out of reflexes. Skinner agrees
that most human behavior is of the operant kind, that is, behaviors
emitted by the organism at "will" and not elicited by some stimulus.
But emitted behaviors, according to Skinner, are no less determined
than elicited behaviors. They just appear to be emerging by the
choice of the organism. In actuality, they are being controlled by the
reinforcing environment.
Since the feelings and thoughts of a person are also controlled
by the environment, the person may have all the experiences of
feeling free choices, motivation behind behavior, and creative
thoughts, but in actuality these feelings of freedom are illusions.
Therefore, human behavior has none of the appearances or feelings
of automated behavior. But, to Skinner we are nonetheless con
trolled. If we were to visit a future Walden Two, its inhabitants
would not appear in any way mechanized or controlled in their
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behavior. According to Skinner they would feel exactly as people
always have, except perhaps a little happier.
SKINNER'S THEORIES
DEHUMANIZE MAN
AND DESTROY HIS FREEDOM

Supposedly what is meant by
this criticism is that Skinner's
theories have not recognized
the whole of human nature, and
his behavioral technology would destroy man as man along with
human freedom. Skinner's answer to this objection is that you can
not destroy something that is not there in the first place. Human
nature and human freedom simply do not exist. Our only evidence
that they exist is the presence of feelings of freedom and creative
thought and language. But these are only products of the environ
ment. Behaviorism does not take these away; it merely describes
them for what they really are. Skinner (1974) writes:
A science of behavior has been said to dehumanize man because
it is reductionistic. It is said to deal with one kind of fact as if it
were a different kind—as is done, for example, by physiological
psychology. But behaviorism does not move from one dimen
sional system to another. It simply provides an alternative ac
count of the same facts. It does not reduce feelings to bodily
states; it simply argues that bodily states are and always have
been what are felt. (p. 265)
A major criticism concerns the weight Skinner seems to put on
the scientific analysis of thought and feeling. He is claiming that his
science has successfully explained where thoughts, intentions, and
emotions come from as well as their relationship to the environ
ment. But this is simply not the case. Skinner has extrapolated his
findings on animals and simple behaviors and applied them to the
complex world of a person's inner experience. In very vague and
sketchy descriptions he "guesses" how the environment might pro
duce everything from self-awareness to the great literature of the
world. If Skinner is wrong, and human nature and freedom are real
(as evidence leads us to suspect), then his behaviorism is reduc
tionistic and leaves us with a significantly dehumanized description
of man.
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SKINNER DENIES
THE EXISTENCE OF THE MIND

Skinner does not deny the
existence of an inner realm of
thought and emotions. What he
does deny is the common interpretation of these feelings as coming
from some mysterious entity called the mind or soul or self or any
other name we wish to give it. Skinner's radical behaviorism does
not deny mental states like methodological behaviorism or logical
positivism, which refuse to consider them. He says that what is felt,
or introspectively observed is not some nonphysical world of con
sciousness, mind, or mental life. It is only a product of the body's
interaction with the environment. Skinner comments on this (1974):
In the sense in which we say that a person is conscious of his
surroundings, he is conscious of states or events in his body; he is
under their control as stimuli. ... A person becomes conscious
in a different sense when a verbal community arranges con
tingencies under which he not only sees an object but sees that
he is seeing it. In this special sense, consciousness or awareness
is a social product. ... No special kind of mind stuff is assumed.
A physical world generates both physical action and the physical
conditions within the body to which a person responds when a
verbal community arranges the necessary contingencies, (pp.
241-42)

Once again Skinner's view of the mind is highly speculative
and will find little acceptance without the support of further re
search. Skinner's ideas have done little to discredit the more
rationalistic approaches to explaining the mind, which show evi
dence of a much smaller role for the environment in the develop
ment and functioning of the human mind.
SKINNER CONSIDERS
CONCEPTS OF VALUE AND ETHICS
IRRELEVANT

Skinner does not consider values and moral
behavior irrelevant in a
practical sense; he cer
tainly has moral concern and makes value decisions in every-day
life. He also believes that counseling and behavioral engineering
require a set of values and an explicit ethical system. He feels,
however, that these values are not derived from a "god out there" or
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from some built-in motivation toward the good. What we call good
or valuable is a product of the reinforcing environment. Ultimately,
we call those actions good that are reinforcing to us. A good per
sonality trait is one that is reinforcing to you. A valuable person to
have in the community is one who contributes to the survival of the
community. Skinner (1974) says:
the behavior we call moral or just is a product of special kinds of
social contingencies arranged by governments, religions, eco
nomic systems, and ethical groups. We need to analyze those
contingencies if we are to build a world in which people behave
morally and justly, and a first step in that direction is to dismiss
morality and justice as personal possessions, (pp. 268-69)

Skinner (1974) feels that the admirable moral qualities in us are
a product of the countercontrol of others.
When we ask why a person is benevolent, devoted, compassion
ate, or public spirited, we find ourselves examining the effect his
behavior has on others. .. . The consequences responsible for
benevolent, devoted, compassionate, or public-spirited behavior
are forms of countercontrol, and when they are lacking, these
much-admired features of behavior are lacking, (p. 210)

Skinner's answer tells us why many people behave in good and
moral ways, but it does not really tell us how we can know what is
good and moral behavior. To say that good and moral behavior is
that which is reinforcing describes not just good but all repetitive
behavior. According to Skinner, if it was not reinforcing, the be
havior would not exist. But how does he know it is wrong for a man
in the street to steal a woman's purse? If the man keeps doing it, we
must assume that he finds it reinforcing. To say that good behavior is
that which is reinforced leads to saying that purse snatching in many
instances may be good. Skinner does argue that such acts are not
ultimately reinforcing (if the man gets caught and goes to jail). But
that doesn't answer the question as to why purse snatching or any
immoral act does not become extinct on the earth because of lack of
ultimate reinforcement. The history of our planet should tell us that
bad behaviors have not decreased at all in the last few thousand
years!
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While Skinner does not consider value and ethics irrelevant, he
lacks an adequate foundation for discussing or making moral deci
sions. What if the victim of the purse snatcher wonders whether it is
moral for her to shoot the thief? What would Skinner say to her
about the morality of her act? Is it even possible to provide her with
information about the ultimate consequences of her act on the sur
vival of the community?
TRUTH IS UNDISCOVERABLE
GIVEN SKINNER'S DETERMINISM

If everything a person says
has been conditioned by his
background, then we cannot
know that what he says is true. If he had a different background,
then he would be teaching some other position. If we apply Skin
ner's logic to his own teachings, for example, we could ask why he
(or anyone else for that matter) should believe that his teachings on
radical behaviorism are true. Ultimately, we could not say they
were true but rather that we have been conditioned to believe they
are true!
Skinner deals with this criticism in Verbal Behavior (1957)
by pointing out all the complicated research supporting his
theories. But Skinner's choosing to run certain experiments in cer
tain ways and with certain interpretations of the data are also de
termined. Why did he choose to perform his research on animals,
for example? Did that not shape his findings? Consequently, how
can he know his research points toward truth in understanding
humans?
Skinner (1957) comments on this:
But have I told him the truth: Who can say? A science of verbal
behavior probably makes no provision for truth or certainty
(though we cannot even be certain of that), (p. 456)

He says, speaking of scientific knowledge (Skinner, 1974),
There is a special sense in which it could be 'true' if it yields the
most effective action possible. ... a proposition is 'true' to the
extent that with its help the listener responds effectively to the
situation it describes, (p. 259)
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It can be seen by these quotes that Skinner avoids discussing truth as
absolute. The only definition for truth that determinism leaves is
"that which is effective," or "that which works." But this definition
is meaningless unless we can know what "effective" actions are.
How can we know what an effective action is unless we already
have some truth about effective actions?
Skinner cannot satisfactorily answer the problem of the loss
of truth because no answer is possible unless we assume that the
universe and all its inhabitants just naturally evolve toward a
truth that works. This still does not tell us if our knowledge at
any particular moment is true until long after we raise the ques
tion, and so it leaves us suspended over the gaping chasm of skep
ticism.
SKINNER'S BEHAVIORAL ENGINEERING
OPENS US UP TO
UNSCRUPULOUS CONTROL

To Skinner, questions
such as, Who will
control? or Might not
evil men use Skin
ner's powerful technology? are irrelevant questions. In the deter
ministic system everyone is already controlled by something in the
environment even if he calls it self control. The only change in a
behavioral technology is to arrange the contingencies of control,
rather than let them operate randomly. This means that even the
controller is controlled by his environment, which includes those he
supposedly controls. That such countercontrol exists is Skinner's
reassuring answer to us.
When a person changes his physical or social environment
"intentionally"—that is, in order to change human behavior,
possibly including his own—he plays two roles; one as a
controller, as the designer of a controlling culture, and another as
the controlled, as the product of a culture. (1971, p. 197)
To say that all control is manipulative and hence wrong is to
overlook important uses in education, psychotherapy, govern
ment, and elsewhere. A proposal to terminate behavioral re
search or to sequester its results on the grounds that they can be
used by despots and tyrants would be a disastrous mistake, be
cause it would undermine all the important contributions of the

100 • B. F. SKINNER'S BEHAVIORISM
culture and interfere with the counter-controlling measures
which keep aversive and exploitative control within bounds.
(1974, p. 268)

Skinner's statements about countercontrol are only meaningful
and reassuring if determinism is true and everyone is controlled by
evenly balanced contingencies in the environment. However, that
is assuming that life is like a poker game in which every player
continually has an equal number of poker chips with which to bet.
But, as we glance around the "table" of life, that does not appear to
be the case. Some individuals in this life, for whatever reason
(chance, talent, environment, et al.), do seem to hold more control
over the major reinforcements and punishments than others. Coun
tercontrol capabilities may exist somewhere in the environment to
control the despot, like Hitler, but millions of his citizens did not
seem to have a handle on how to countercontrol. To say that Hitler
was countercontrol led by the advancing Allied troops ignores the
fact that he was more in control of German and Jewish citizens than
they were of him. If men are not determined, then we ought to
worry about unscrupulous control, because controllers could resist
the influences we create in their environments and choose instead
to exercise aversive power.
SKINNER'S RESEARCH WITH ANIMALS
AND SIMPLE BEHAVIORS
RELATES VERY LITTLE TO THE
COMPLEXITY OF HUMAN NATURE

Skinner is quick to
point out that this objection is assuming
that human behavior
is somehow different
from animal behaviors or simple responses, which is a question for
science to answer. In responding to this objection Skinner (1953)
says:
To insist upon this discontinuity at the beginning of a scientific
investigation is to beg the question. Human behavior is distin
guished by its complexity, its variety, and its greater accom
plishments, but the basic processes are not therefore necessarily
different. Science advances from the simple to the complex; it
is constantly concerned with whether the processes and laws
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discovered at one stage are adequate for the next. It would be
rash to assert at this point that there is no essential difference
between human behavior and the behavior of lower species; but
until an attempt has been made to deal with both in the same
terms, it would be equally rash to assert that there is. (p. 38)
More recently Skinner (1974) writes that enough experimenta
tion has been done to warrant holding to these initial extrapolations
from animal behavior that he has applied to complex human be
havior. He says, "Enough has been done to suggest that the same
basic processes occur in both animals and men." (p. 250)
Skinner has made a good point that if science, especially the
science of human behavior, is to be successful, it must begin with
the simple before analyzing the complex. And the use of animal
subjects has a long and accepted history in psychology. The prob
lem with this answer, however, is that one should not begin and end
with the simple experiment. There have been operant conditioning
experiments run on human beings, even in complex environments.
But there have been too few of them and the connections between
the results in the Skinner Box and the results in human experi
mentation have been poorly made, if at all.
Human experimentation that has not controlled for the
subject-experimenter interactions, the past history of the subject,
and the cognitive "behavior" of the subject cannot be safely as
sumed to demonstrate the truth of Skinner's theories. Human
experiments may be difficult to run and control, but Skinner has
never seriously attempted to demonstrate his theories in complex
human behaviors. In fact, Skinner's major views on human nature
were written during the height of his animal experimentation and
before much human experimentation had even been attempted.
Also, it is not begging the question to be open to the possibility
that humans are qualitatively different from animals. Since Skinner's
assumptions on the identical behavioral bases for both human and
animal behaviors seem as of yet undemonstrated by scientific
experimentation, are they not "begging the question" just as much
as the views of human nature that posit some radical differences
between human and animal nature?
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SKINNER DOES NOT LIVE AS IF

Skinner's basic an

DETERMINISM WERE TRUE.
WHY DOES HE USE MENTALISTIC TERMS?

swer to these ques-

WHY DOES HE WRITE A BOOK?

tions is that whatever he does, he
has been deter-

mined to do by his environment. If we wonder why he does some
thing, he suggests that we study his environmental history. If we
wonder why a man who believes that we are determined would
ever write a book urging us to choose to do something, he responds
that he is determined to write such a book (Skinner, 1974).
According to the traditional definitions of self-control, happiness,
decision, responsibility, and urging, the behaviorist is indeed
inconsistent, but according to his own definitions he is not; and
when the latter are understood, objections of this sort lose their
force, (p. 272)

To the question, "Why does Skinner even bother to write a book?"
he responds (1974):
To answer that question we should have to go into the history of
the behaviorist. Nothing he says about human behavior seriously
changes the effect of that history. His research has not altered his
concern for his fellow men or his belief in the relevance of a
science or technology of behavior, (pp. 272-73)

This answer may be correct within Skinner's deterministic sys
tem, but it is hardly a satisfying answer to those raising the objec
tion. It is not clear what is going through the mind of Skinner as he
writes his books. Does he consciously think of his book as a
stimulus that will in someway change human operant behavior? Or
do his actions reveal a belief that people are free and can change
their behavior if urged to do so?
To the specific objection that he uses mentalistic language in
the very books that condemn mentalistic constructs, he writes
(1974):
I have used technical terms in making a technical point. I have
preferred a technical term elsewhere when it could be used at no
great cost. Rather than say that our problem is "to create a con
cern for the future," I have preferred to say that it is "to induce
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people to act with respect to a future." I prefer the expression "It
occurred to me." But elsewhere I have freely used the lay vo
cabulary while accepting the responsibility of providing a tech
nical translation upon demand. There is no other way if a book of
this kind is to be brief and readable, (pp. 271-72)

SKINNER IGNORES ANY PSYCHOLOGY
THAT DOES NOT
AGREE WITH HIS SYSTEM

Skinner does not respond favorably to
other areas of psy
chology, primarily
because he rejects any attempt to theorize about physical or mental
constructs in order to account for human behavior. He says in an
interview with Psychology Today (Hall, 1967):
I think the main objection to behaviorism is that people are in
love with the mental apparatus. If you say that doesn't really
exist, that it's a fiction and let's get back to the facts, then they
have to give up their first love. .. . This Freudian business is
dying out, anyway. As for the cognitive seed, that never was
anything; they are not getting anywhere; and the operant people
are. . . . When all their mythical machinery finally grinds to a halt
and is laid aside, discarded, then we will see'what is remem
bered fifty or a hundred years from now . . . you can't get results
by sitting around and theorizing about the inner world of the
disturbed, (p. 109)

Skinner's rejection of most areas of psychology illustrates the
academic isolation of his radical behaviorism. His system is so re
strictive that it can benefit from no other kind of data or theories in
psychology. The problem is not just that Skinner neglects cognitive
and physiological data, but that his behaviorism offers no sufficient
method to study such ideas in order to reject them.
SKINNER'S BEHAVIORISM
REPRESENTS SCIENTISM,
NOT SCIENCE

Skinner insists that his behaviorism
has been more scientific than almost
any area of psychology. He feels that
his emphasis on the investigation of

basic processes with careful attention to the design and control of
experiments is what science is all about. He says (1974):
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Behaviorists are sometimes accused of idolatry; they are said to
worship science and to borrow the trappings of science simply in
order to look scientific. . . . But it is hard to find any sign of this in
the history of the experimental analysis of behavior. Early studies
used simple equipment, and the data were reported as simply as
possible. The underlying assumption that behavior was orderly
rather than capricious could scarcely be said to have been
adopted for honorific purposes. To establish the dimensions of
behavior and related variables, to insist upon prediction and
control, to use mathematics where quantification permitted—
these were essential steps rather than window dressing, (p. 256)

While it is true that Skinner should not be accused of operating
unscientifically in the laboratory, that is not true about the many
statements of "fact" that he bases on assumptions about the nature
of reality, humankind, and knowledge rather than upon experi
mentation. It is in these areas that Skinner's philosophical assump
tions influence his statements and are offered as the findings of
science rather than as one narrow philosophical perspective—here
he can perhaps rightly be accused of scientism.
In general it can be seen that there is not a lot of
effective communication going on between Skinner
and his critics. The communication that exists leaves neither side
impressed by the other's arguments. This is largely due to the fact
that Skinner and his critics are arguing from radically different
starting assumptions about reality and human nature. Skinner's
seeming disinterest in the kind of questions that philosophers raise is
not due to an ignorance on his part of the philosophical arguments,
but to his belief in the truth of his radical behaviorism. In the same
way, some hostility to Skinner's ideas probably arises because his
critics are inclined to reject all of his work because of his unaccept
able philosophical framework. More meaningful dialogue would
ensue if Skinner's critics attempted to understand his scientific
indings and ideas in the context of their own philosophical as
sumptions about reality and man. In the next chapter I will attempt
to suggest some of the directions this effort could take for those
interested in relating Skinner's work to historical Christian thought.
SUMMARY

n CHRISTIAN RESPONSE

Our analysis of B. F. Skinner's
research and theoretical labor
has shown that his strong £1 points lie in his scientific
methodology and laboratory 5# data. Skinner has made im
mense contributions to psychology with his operant-conditioning
paradigm and its numerous applications to animal and human
learning. He has explored and quantified some of the ways we are
affected by our environment; he has gone a long way toward ex
plaining how this process works—at least in animal behavior and
some simple human activities. The application of behavioristic
principles to the field of clinical psychology by those who had been
influenced by Skinner is also providing a technology to deal with a
variety of psychological disturbances. The impact of Skinner's
theory of human and animal behavior has without a doubt changed
the entire field of psychology. Few other theorists in the onehundred-year history of psychology have contributed so much.
On the other hand, Skinner's journeys into the realm of
philosophical speculation on human nature seem to go far beyond
what his data will support. His dogmatic dependence upon a single,
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empirical method for knowing about human nature has narrowed his
scope of understanding of the human personality on issues like
language, freedom, dignity, and ethics. It has also left him opposing
many respected views on human nature. In chapters 4-8, we looked
at some of the major conflicts between Skinner's assumptions on
human freedom and competing views, and also at some of the serious
gaps in Skinner's theorizing. However, we have not yet directly
addressed the question of the compatibility of Skinner's views on
human nature with those of Christianity. In this chapter we will look
at some of these key areas and attempt to see precisely what areas of
compatibility and conflict exist. To do this, we will look at various
aspects of Skinner's theories that the Bible also speaks to.
Specifically, we will look at the biblical view of human nature,
human freedom, and the source of value and ethics. As a foundation
for this, we must also take a brief look at the biblical view of reality,
including the reality of God and the nature of His revelation.
In attempting to set forth some fundamental features of the
Bible's views of reality and human nature, I am not attempting to
erect a biblical psychology or to give detailed statements on the
human personality. The Bible, in general, limits its teachings on
human nature to brief but far-reaching descriptions concerning the
origin and destiny of man and the relationship of man to God and
other men. It is debatable whether a complete "biblical psychol
ogy can be constructed from such content. While the Bible does
not exhaust the subject of human nature, and while it does not give
detailed or specific descriptions of how the personality functions, it
does provide some very clear parameters and definitive statements
that enable us to evaluate at least the broadest and most fundamen
tal concepts of theorists like Skinner.
THE NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE

In an earlier chapter, we

OF REALITY

critiqued Skinner's strictly

materialistic and naturalistic
assumptions about the nature of reality. Since he sees the entire
world (including humanity) as composed of only matter and
operating by laws of cause and effect alone, he rules out the
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existence of any reality other than material realities and denies the
validity of any methods of knowing except pure empiricism. He
writes (Skinner, 1971, 1974):
The picture which emerges from a scientific analysis is not of a
body with a person inside, but of a body which is a person in the
sense that it displays a complex repertoire of behavior, (p. 190) A
person is not an originating agent; he is a locus, a point at which
many genetic and environmental conditions come together in a
joint effect, (p. 185)

In this chapter, we will examine Skinner's views of the nature of
reality and the nature of persons to discover how well they fit with
biblical revelation.
The Bible stands dramatically apart from the naturalistic, mate
rialistic pronouncements of our age to assert that God exists and that
He is the source of all that is. The Bible opens with, "In the begin
ning God created" (Gen. 1:1). John tells us, "In the beginning was
the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God"
(John 1:1). God was there before there was material reality. Ac
cording to Scripture, the Creator is not an impersonal force, but a
personal being who has revealed Himself to humanity. The exist
ence of a personal, creative, communicating God does not permit
us to understand life solely in natural and material terms. Although a
restricted, materialistic view might be helpful for the limited pur
pose of scientific predictability, we cannot expect to fully under
stand any part of the universe apart from both God's creative pur
poses and continuing activity. Hebrews 1:3 aptly tells us that He
sustains "all things by his powerful word." This is apparently a
continuing, active sustaining of the universe. The Bible does not
present God as the deist's absent God or a God who is there but is in
no way involved with the natural order. Donald MacKay (1974)
writes:
I think, the key to the whole problem of the relation of science to
the Christian faith, is that God, and God's activity, come in not as
extras here and there, but everywhere. ... if the divine activity
means anything, then all the events of what we call the physical
world are dependent on that activity, (p. 57)
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When the scientist discovers the laws of nature, he is not dis
covering exceptions or alternatives to God's activity; he is simply
describing that activity in its physical manifestations. The Christian
view of God, in fact, does not allow us to separate the activities of
God from the activities of nature. Consequently, the Christian has
no quarrel with Skinner's data. Skinner has uncovered some of
God's laws governing certain animal and human behaviors. The
problem arises only when Skinner generalizes from his data and
makes broad assumptions about the nature of reality that are unsupportable by data and in conflict with biblical revelation. At the very
moment Skinner is attacking the "nonscientific" views and as
sumptions of theorists who disagree with him he is operating on his
own unprovable assumptions. As E. J. Carnell (1948) put it:
The mistake of the modern man is that he pronounces the ben
ediction when the scientist has spoken, not realizing that there
are yet superhypotheses which must be made before even the
subordinate laws of science are significant, (p. 94)
The enigmatic situation in the modern world is that the sci
entist rejects the Christian world-view because it involves certain
non-empirical metaphysical hypotheses, while assuming for
himself a truckload, each of which goes as much beyond sensory
observation as does the Christian's postulate of the Cod Who has
revealed Himself in Scripture. The Christian questions the sport
of this game. Fair rules in the contest of hypothesis-making ought
to dictate that the winner be he who can produce the best set of
assumptions to account for the totality of reality. If the Christian is
disqualified from the arena by rules which his opponent makes, it
is evident that the game has been 'fixed.' Good sportsmanship, to
say nothing of common sense, requires that in a contest, all
participants be given the same advantages as well as the same
handicaps. Without these conditions there is no sport, (p. 94-95)
Rather than yielding to Skinner's attempt to baptize his
theoretical assumptions about reality in the waters of "science," the
Christian needs to consider the foundation of these assumptions and
compare them to biblical ones. The Bible affirms that we can gain
knowledge through the revelation of God as well as through
naturalistic methods and that the combination presents a more
a equate picture of the nature of reality. The historical position of
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the church is that God has revealed truth about Himself and His
creation in two ways. General revelation comprises the truths that
God reveals through nature and history that can be grasped by the
human intellect because as bearers of the image of God we are
intelligent, rational beings. These truths can be grasped by scientific
investigation, observation, logic and so on; Skinner's empirical
findings would be considered part of general revelation.
Special revelation, on the other hand, includes truth communi
cated through the Bible and the person of Jesus Christ. In the study
of human nature, we need special revelation because empirical
investigation in this field is limited and biased by false assumptions.
There are many truths about human nature that cannot be assessed
by scientific methods or deduced by our logic. Such things as man's
immaterial nature (if it exists!), life after death, purpose in life, and
ethical absolutes cannot be investigated adequately through strict
empiricism or rationalism. The special revelation of Scripture treats
many of these questions that are not within the range of empirical
science and, consequently, adds immeasurably to our understand
ing of human nature. Both science, which studies the universe God
created (general revelation), and the data of Scripture (special reve
lation) provide a view of the nature of reality and a broader access
to truth—especially about the human personality.
Psychologists who like Skinner have no belief in a Creator have
a limited source for fully understanding personality and recognizing
the distinctions between mankind and the animal world. They reject
the humanity's distinctive creation in the image of God.
Skinner apparently holds tenaciously to a view that makes man
a biological machine and it is difficult for him to see personal man
as the exception in a nonpersonal, material universe. That would
limit the applicability of his research and consequently humanity's
efforts to control its own destiny. Skinner sees his rejection of man
as a personal, self-directing species as freeing us for future growth
and development. In reality it does precisely the opposite. By so
limiting his focus on sources of knowledge to empirical methods,
Skinner actually binds the study of the person to a narrow and
restrictive band of functions, and leaves untouched the essential
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uniqueness of humanity. In "freeing" the science of psychology to
use only empirical methods for the study of observable behavior he
would actually bind us from the study of the areas of personality that
are most distinctively human!
The Bible, as revelation from God, is a source that makes it
possible for Christians to study more successfully what has to be the
most complicated subject matter in the universe—human nature. It
has been said that the mysteries of the brain alone rival the com
plexity of any other phenomenon in the universe. Indeed, in order
to learn more about the intricacies of our whole beings, we will
need a method of knowing that is capable of seeing beyond the
limited range of empiricism—one that can give us a complete pic
ture of man. Only from the perspective of the Creator Himself can
the deepest questions in human life be answered.
THE QUESTION OF
HUMAN NATURE

Skinner's detailed studies on operant conditioning have emphasized how closely
human behavior is tied to reinforcements in
the environment; they have helped to demonstrate that the human
mind is not an independent entity, but is influenced, sometimes
rather strongly, by the bodily states of a person. With this, the Chris
tian has no problem. Skinner's radical behaviorism, however, and
his reductionism teach that thinking, willing, and feeling are noth
ing more than physiology interacting with the environment. His
view runs counter to the Christian perspective of the person as being
endowed with an immaterial essence that relates to, but is not con
trolled by, the material body.
It is difficult to summarize the biblical view of human nature
since it would undoubtedly fill many volumes. There are a few
features, however, of the biblical doctrine of man that are espe
cially relevant to Skinner's view of human nature. The impression
the Bible gives us concerning humanity is in conflict with Skinner's
behaviorism in that man has central position in the whole of
reality. Humanity is the peak of creation and the object of divine
love. Our supreme value is that we are children of God who can
possess a dynamic, intimate relationship with the Creator. The
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teaching and actions of Jesus emphasize the worth of man; the
Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath (Mark 10:31).
Man is more valuable than the animals (Matt. 10:31, Luke 12:7;
Matt. 12:12), and man's eternal soul is of more worth than any
thing in this world.
Another prominent feature of the biblical view of human nature
is that man is not an isolated, self-explained being. In fact, Scripture
emphasizes that man cannot be understood or explained aside from
his relationship to God. G. C. Berkhouwer (1962) explains:
We cannot understand "man" apart from his relation to God.
Man would then be, from a scriptural viewpoint, nothing but an
abstraction, and if we seek to define man merely in terms of
various qualities and abilities, we are not giving a biblical picture
of man. (p. 93)

This means that while we may learn much about man with
empirical methods, those methods can never disclose the total
reality of man's essence. Man's whole being is dominated by the
fact that he was created to enter into, and live out a loving, depend
ent, and obedient relationship with God. Jeremiah 10:23 tells us
that a man's life is not his own. The mystery of personality is bound
up with dependence on and interaction with the Creator.
Since mankind was created to know God and to commune
with Him, it stands to reason that God would make human nature
capable of a personal relationship with Himself. There are limita
tions to bodily existence (Gen. 2:7-3:19), but the Bible also teaches
that human beings are a special creation made similar to God.
While much debate surrounds the precise meaning of the image of
God in man, we can safely assume that this image and likeness
relates to the personality of man. As persons we are agents of our
own behavior. We are creative, rational, moral, and social beings.
And most importantly, we stand apart from the animals in our ca
pacity for a deep and intimate relationship with God.
The Bible also emphasizes the essential unity of human nature.
Genesis 2:7 describes human life as the unity of the physical and
spiritual. "And the LORD God formed man from the dust of the
ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man
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became a living being." This holistic view of human nature is im
portant when evaluating Skinner's behaviorism. Human nature,
while intricately physical, is not merely biological. On the other
hand, in emphasizing the existence of personality, we must not
divorce mental life from the body and thereby ignore the environ
mental influences upon human nature.
Another relevant aspect of the biblical view of human nature is
the fall into sin. According to Scripture, the first human pair rebelled
against God and threw the entire human race into alienation from
the Creator and from each other. Although this fall did not destroy
the image of God in man it did seriously distort it. Man lost com
munion with God and the inclination to God's will; there was no
possibility for self-recovery. According to Scripture, all of human
ity's problems—physical, social, and psychological—can ulti
mately be traced to this spiritual alienation and the excessive selfcenteredness caused by the Fall.
The five elements of the biblical view of humanity we have just
surveyed (the central position of man in God's created order, the
impossibility of understanding man apart from his relationship with
his creator, the essential differentiation of man from the animal
kingdom, the holistic view of the nature of persons, and humanity's
sinfulness) are in agreement with many psychological observations
of humanity. Man towers above the animal world in his reason,
morality, emotional expression, culture building, and person-social
relationships. In contrast, Skinner attempts to attribute the entire
range of humanity's ability, potential, and creative genius to simply
the physical and environmental realms. His view does not accord
with these broad, biblical observations. The Christian view, which
sees our uniqueness as originating from and relating to the God of
the universe, seems much more consistent with the amazing
achievements and potentials so apparent in human nature. Al
though relating humanity's genius to the creative activity of God is
not provable by the methods of science, it is no less provable than
Skinner's naturalistic and materialistic assumptions, and it appears
to be at least as capable (if not more so) of explaining the unique
phenomena of human nature.
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In addition to fitting more naturally with our observations of the
fundamental differences between humans and animals, the biblical
view of human nature, which stresses humanity's relationship to
God, provides a firm basis for identity and self-worth. Skinner's
behaviorism can only provide a fragile foundation for self-esteem
based on arbitrary pronouncements of self-worth in a cold universe
in contrast to the living, dynamic foundation for self-esteem that
grows out of viewing man as a creation of the living God!
The biblical emphasis on the unity of man's nature is also in
agreement with neurophysiological studies, which show a very
close relationship between brain activity and human functioning. If
man is a unified being, we cannot understand human nature as
simply a summation of various parts. We must be alert to a dynamic
interaction of the whole person with the environment.
The Christian view of the Fall (and potential redemption) al
lows us to look more deeply at the source of humanity's emotional,
behavioral, and social problems than if we attended simply to
environmental factors. Although a discussion of the causes of psy
chological maladjustment is beyond the scope of this book, Skin
ner's concept of the person as a blank slate that is shaped toward
goodness or badness by the environment simply does not account
for the perversity of human nature as well as the biblical view.
While recognizing these environmental influences, the Christian
view also attends to the basic propensity of humans to respond in
selfish and self-defeating ways. The Christian concept of sin pro
vides this balancing frame of reference.
THE QUESTION OF
FREEDOM

The determinism of human nature as taught
by Skinner springs ultimately from his de
nial of the uniqueness of the human per
sonality. The biblical concept of human freedom flows logically
from the view of humanity as a bearer of the image of God. It seems
clear that the Bible teaches the essential freedom of human nature.
The Old and New Testaments are filled with God's requirements for
human behavior. God holds human beings responsible for their
actions and expects them to correct sinful behavior. God also
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clearly desires that His love toward humanity will be returned. In
fact, the whole drama of sin and evil, beginning in the garden of
Eden and continuing until this day, implies that something has gone
wrong in God's universe. God created human beings with the free
dom to act counter to His will.
While Skinner's research has uncovered a basic lawfulness re
lating human and animal behavior to the environment, these factors
do not destroy freedom any more than our basic sinfulness destroys
our ability to be responsible. If we use the term influence instead of
determinism, Skinner's contributions (and those of many other be
havioral psychologists) can be placed in a more realistic perspec
tive. The Bible makes it clear that human beings influence each
other (Prov. 22:6), and the view of an "influencing" environment
also allows for the existence of freedom (freedom does not have to
mean choices without influence). There can be little doubt that
everything we are, is at least in part a product of the environment in
which we exist, but this does not destroy human freedom, it simply
balances it and puts it in perspective. We live in a complex universe
ordered by God in which we have the power to make willful
choices that impact both our lives and the lives of others. There is a
balance between individual freedom to choose (which we all have)
and the influences of others upon our choices.
This biblical view of man's freedom does not assert that free
actions are capricious, uncaused happenings, that are unrelated to
either one's past history or environmental influences. It suggests
instead that free behavior is ultimately caused by the person himself
in the context of these other variables. These other variables are a
necessary part of the explanation of human behavior since human
nature is not separate from the natural order. Such variables, how
ever, are not a sufficient explanation. Evans (1977) speaks about
freedom of man within the natural order.
He becomes what he becomes in the context of these social roles
which tremendously limit and weight his options as an agent.
Nevertheless, as a rational, responsible agent, he is not merely
formed by these social relationships; he acts and by acting helps
to form these roles in turn. He is not only constituted by these

BEHAVIORISM IN THE LIGHT OF SCRIPTURE • 115
relationships; he himself consitutes them. He plays a role in
continuing them, modifying them for better or worse, enhancing
or degrading their quality and character (p. 145).

The importance of a belief in the freedom of human nature
cannot be overemphasized when it comes to using psychology to
help solve humanities' personal and social problems. In our design
of counseling methods or social programs, believing in human free
dom forces us to draw upon the powerful resources of the individual
for change (these resources that remain of limited interest to the
radical behaviorist). Our belief in human freedom does not deny the
influence of the environment on man, but because we believe in
freedom we can strive to help a person gain control over his envi
ronment. Believing in both human freedom and the strong
influences of the environment allows us to retain a view of human
responsibility and dignity and at the same time not lose our compas
sion for those who have been tremendously handicapped by severe
environmental circumstances and therefore used less of the poten
tial freedom.
THE QUESTION OF
VALUE AND CONTROL

One cannot read Walden Two, Skinner's Utopian novel, without being
impressed by his desire to apply
his theory to the severe problems faced by the world. Skinner has
emphasized what we all should agree to—that human problems
today are almost out of control and something needs to be done to
help people lead productive, happy lives. Skinner is also optimistic
enough to believe that our problems can be solved. As we saw in
Chapter 7, however, even if Skinner's methodology could be
applied in the optimistic manner Walden Two envisions, it would
fail to provide any meaningful direction and source of value for the
changes taking place. Thus, even its potential value for change in
the culture becomes immediately suspect.
In contrast to Skinner's Utopia, the Christian has a solid basis for
assigning worth to a particular behavior or direction in science
because the Bible contains both ethical absolutes and general prin
ciples that can guide behavior. The Christian ethic, rather t an
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being the result of arbitrary human decisions, is anchored firmly in
the unchanging nature of a Cod of perfect love and justice. This
does not mean that the Christian ethic is based upon the arbitrary
will of a supreme being; its basis is the unchanging character of
Cod. Christian theologians Geisler and Feinberg (1980) for exam
ple, assert, "If God is all-good and all-knowing as the Christian
believes, then He and He alone is in the best position to declare
what is valuable and what is not valuable for finite creatures
(p. 367).
The Christian ethic is superior to Skinner's natural ethic be
cause it has its basis in the unchanging character of God. Skinner
can only point to what men seem to be doing successfully and claim
that this is a "natural law" in their behavior. Actually, what men
believe ought to be done or how they would like to be treated is
frequently closer to the natural law in man than is his behavior!
With God as the source of direction the Christian has a perfect and
loving center of reference whereas Skinner can only rely on the
natural inclinations of imperfect men as the source of guidance and
value.
The Christian view of change in society also offers a superior
motivation than Skinner's reinforcement theory. Since man is a free
person, he is challenged by God to do right and love his neighbor
because God has commanded it. Furthermore, he is assured con
tinually in the Bible (Pss. 1, 19, 119; Prov. 1-9) that the doing of
right will result in blessings. The Christian has hope for a better
world, not because his environment will change, but because he
has experienced a spiritual rebirth that deeply impacts his basic
self-centered propensity. In relationship with God the believer not
only knows the good, but has a new motivation to pursue it.
In conclusion, it can be seen that biblical revela
tion is compatible with the data Skinner has
gathered and that the data is consistent with an ordered universe
created by God. Skinner's findings are a part of our understanding of
God's general revelation, and as such are an important part of our
understanding of human nature. This same biblical revelation,

CONCLUSION
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however, is opposed to Skinner's total determinism, narrow empiri
cism, and naturalistically-based value system. As Christians we
should feel free to utilize the findings of Skinner's science in a range
of clinical applications. We should not delude ourselves, however,
into thinking that his learning paradigm is a fully complete or accu
rate presentation of the dynamic operations of personality. As Jeeves
(1976) put it:
I must distinguish carefully between Skinner's scientific contri
bution and his speculative writings. It is in the latter that he freely
imports his own values, beliefs, hopes and fears, but this impor
tation should not detract from the importance of the former.
(p. 61)
So long as Skinner's model is evaluated on its merits as a
contribution to our techniques for shaping and maintaining be
havior there is not conflict with Christian beliefs. Conflicts arise
when unjustified extrapolations are made, such as that, because
aspects of animal and human behavior can be manipulated using
their techniques man is therefore 'nothing but' a stimulusresponse machine, (p. 62)

As should be apparent from the relative lack of emphasis on the
specific clinical applications of Skinner's behaviorism, our analysis
of Skinner was not designed primarily to answer questions about the
use of behavior modification techniques for weight control, reduc
ing smoking, or stimulating more assertive behavior. Given the
Christian understanding of general revelation and the fact that all
truth is God's truth, we should not hesitate to utilize workable prin
ciples that are consistent with biblical revelation. Our goal in this
volume has been to challenge some of Skinner's assumptions; this is
part of a larger issue that is signaled by the tendency of some scien
tists to deny the unique personhood of human beings.
It is perhaps strange that Skinner and other scientists who attack
the concept of personhood trace their academic roots back to the
age of humanism. Then, as now, it was man in all his glory who sent
noble reason around the globe to search out and conquer all the
mysteries of nature and lay them at humanity's feet. Then came the
day when many of these mysteries of nature were unveiled and man
was left with nothing more to conquer except his reason and
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himself. Having finally conquered these he joined the ignoble ranks
of molecule and rat. The optimistic search for truth ended with a
loss of truth; exalted man ended up in a Skinnerian box of his own
construction!
And yet it is not so strange. Without a larger source for under
standing man than nature, a piece of nature he must be. Let us visit
briefly with C. S. Lewis (1947) on this concluding thought.
From this point of view the conquest of Nature appears in a new
light. We reduce things to mere Nature in order that we may
"conquer" them. We are always conquering Nature, because
"Nature" is the name for what we have, to some extent, con
quered. The price of conquest is to treat a thing as mere Nature.
Every conquest over Nature increases her domain. The stars do
not become Nature till we can weigh and measure them; the soul
does not become Nature till we can psychoanalyze her. The
wresting of powers from Nature is also the surrendering of things
to Nature. As long as this process stops short of the final stage we
may well hold that the gain outweighs the loss. But as soon as we
take the final step of reducing our own species to the level of
mere Nature, the whole process is stultified, for this time the
being who stood to gain and the being who has been sacrificed
are one and the same. . . . (pp. 82-84)

But surely it is not yet too late to argue for a view of humankind that
befits its magnificant nature, which at times manifests itself in ways
that can easily be understood according to simple laws of learning,
and at other times manifests itself in complex ways that defy these
naturalistic observations!
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